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Session 1: How to ensure the independence and impartiality 
of WTO adjudicators? 
Chair: H.E. Mr Didier Chambovey, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the 
WTO, Geneva 
Panelists:  Mr Daniel Crosby, Partner, King & Spalding, Geneva  
Mr Stephen Fevrier, Head of Mission, Permanent Delegation of Organisation of Eastern   
Caribbean States to the United Nations, Geneva 
Prof. Dr. Petros C. Mavroidis, Professor, Columbia Law School, New York 
Mr Niall Meagher, Executive Director, Advisory Center on WTO Law, Geneva 
Ms. Sara Nordin, Counsel, White & Case, Geneva 
Ms. Maria Pereyra, Senior Counsellor, Legal Affairs Division, WTO, Geneva 
 
Mr Daniel Crosby 
 
 
How to ensure the independence and 
impartiality of  WTO adjudicators seemed like 
a softball question. We all agree that the 
answer should be according to the DSU and 
should work ok, but in practice it hasn't, in my 
view, always worked out. When Amb. 
Chambovey started with his quote in the 
beginning that adjudicators should approach 
their task with circumspection. I remember 
reading that as well in the last couple of  weeks 
and months while thinking about this and it 
struck me why should adjudicators address an 
issue with circumspection. Is it because they 
feel pressure, they feel they have to conform 
to something or because they are using their 
own brain in the context in which they are 
working. I would suggest that independence 
can exist when you still have pressure. I think 
that is what the first comments were. In a 
system of  checks and balances adjudicators 
feel a pressure to make sure that what they are 
doing is consistent with what they are told to 
do. The problem here, a lot of  the time, is 
what they are told to do is not clear, and then 
if  there is a mistake made there is no way to 
fix it. Under the rules there are a couple of  
ways to fix [mistakes], but in practice nothing 
gets fixed by creating a new rule, so there is 
no way to let off  steam if  the judges get it 
wrong, which is inevitable in every system.  
 
I was interested in Petros's comment […] of  
which biases we are protecting the system 
from through this independence. The solution 
or preference towards institutions struck me 
as interesting as there is always institutional 
bias and in an organization like the WTO, 
where it’s job is to move towards freer trade, 
there are probably going to be biases against 
instruments that lead to less free trade but 
what is referred to as fair trade. I think we 
have seen that bias against a certain 
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interpretation of  those instruments. We 
should consider whether there is institutional 
bias in this house and what it leads to in terms 
of  Members' expectations.  
 
I think Maria raised an interesting point of  a 
concern, not [her particular] concern, but a 
concern that is always hovering about. The 
panelist, the person that we are looking at, 
won't listen to us but sticks to their own 
position and what that means for the result in 
our case. 
 
Now, I will leave you with two other points 
and assumptions. I remember Petros' slide 
with respect to the beginning of  the GATT 
when the Members were a smaller group who 
had more of  a common interest and shared 
view of  things. I submit to you that is not the 
case today, and it leads to different visions of  
what independence is and even whether 
independent judiciary is something we all 
value or not. I don't think we should take for 
granted that independent judiciary is 
something that everybody, and each WTO 
Member, values or enforces, even though it is 
black letter law in the basic texts. I am struck 
by pronouncements by heads of  supreme 
courts of  Members where they very openly 
denounce independent judiciary in some of  
the biggest Members in the house. I don't 
think we can proceed on the basis that we 
have common interests in the economic 
rationale of  the Organization, and I don't 
think we can rest assured that we all share a 
commitment to judicial independence at all. I 
think those two things lead to vastly different 
results when we are thinking about judicial 
independence and value when we put on it. 
 
I will stop there, but in answer to the question 
on how to ensure the independence of  WTO 
adjudicators - right back to the first point, you 
need to have a legislative rule-making function 
in order for there to be legitimacy and 
independence in a balanced way. It is 
impossible to strike that balance without the 
other functions of  the WTO working. I am 
not optimistic that we can solve the 
independence, or maintain the independence, 
issue and fix the adjudicatory function 
without fixing the other parts of  the machine. 
  
3 | W H A T  K I N D  O F  D I S P U T E  S E T T L E M E N T  F O R  T H E  W T O ?  
 
Mr Stephen Fevrier 
 
 
As a delegate and a non-practitioner, I think it is 
also important for me to share my own reflections 
on the need to preserve, if  not reinforce, the 
independence of  the system, particularly for small 
states.  Other contributors to this volume have 
gone into the some of  the mechanics of  the 
appointment process for the Appellate Body 
members, as well as panels, so I will not deal with 
the mechanics, but share my own reflections. 
There are two main areas where the WTO dispute 
settlement system needs to preserve its 
impartiality and independence. The first being in 
the selection process for adjudicators at both the 
panel and appellate review stages of  WTO dispute 
settlement and the second being the approach 
taken by appointed adjudicators in making their 
findings. 
 
On the selection process. To ensure that the best 
persons are appointed to panels, the current 
process envisages the selection of  panellists by the 
DG, based on the recommendation of  the 
Secretariat, in the event that the parties to the 
dispute, themselves, are unable to agree on 
panellists. To my mind this system works well. Of  
course, this process, while somewhat unique, is 
not entirely dissimilar to the process through 
which arbitrators are selected in international 
arbitration proceedings - the parties have primary 
responsibility for the selection of  arbitrators, but 
there is a default mechanism for selecting 
arbitrators in the event that the parties are unable 
to agree.   In the WTO system, if  the Secretariat 
and the DG are to play such a pivotal role in the 
appointment of  adjudicators, it is important that 
they remain impartial with respect to matters that 
are taking place both within and outside of  the 
WTO concerning trade measures which some 
Members may apply. This is particularly 
important, particularly in instances where those 
matters which may be opined on may form the 
core of  disputes in the future. Therefore, 
interventions in the public domain by the 
Secretariat and the DG may affect adversely the 
presumption of  independence and neutrality 
when panels are composed. Overall, the current 
process for the appointment of  panels has proved 
to be useful but the Secretariat and the DG must 
be, and must be seen to be, impartial in their 
public pronouncements. 
 
How could this impartiality and independence be 
preserved, if  not strengthened? One of  the ways 
which currently works fairly well is that the WTO 
employment contracts make staff  duty-bound to 
preserve or adhere to independence and neutrality 
in the execution of  their functions.  These 
functions include, of  course, advice provided on 
the selection of  panellists, and also, and I think 
this is critical, legal advice provided to adjudicators 
in the context of  their execution of  the dispute 
settlement function.  This is critical given the 
influence that legal advice to panels as well as the 
Appellate Body Members coming from the 
Secretariat could have on the findings of  these 
adjudicators. Secondly, panellists are required to 
abide by a code of  conduct. To my mind, given 
the importance of  preserving the impartiality of  
panels the recently issued EU proposal for 
standardizing the body of  potential panellists is a 
good one. This will offer an additional layer of  
transparency and scrutiny. It is also important that 
the Secretariat in its efforts aimed at panel 
selection should not seek persons who are deemed 
to be malleable to Secretariat influence, but 
persons who are willing to offer dissenting views, 
and are unmoveable in their independence. With 
respect to the qualifications of  adjudicators, and 
this is also an important component of  
independence and impartiality, qualification 
requirements for panellists mandate that panellists 
must have a familiarity with the matter before 
them; a sufficient understanding of  trade policy 
and law in order to be able to effectively 
interrogate and assess the facts presented. 
 
Currently, the typical formulation of  panels is one 
lawyer, one subject matter expert, and typically a 
diplomat or government official. This is a good 
balance and, to the extent possible, this should be 
preserved. This allows for different minds with 
different expertise to engage with a particular 
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issue. Unlike in the AB where ABMs have to keep 
an eye on their re-appointment, panellists are, 
almost always, selected by the DG with the 
assistance of  the Secretariat, as opposed to WTO 
Members who can seek to influence  re-
appointment.  
 
Hence, the appointment of  an ABM is subjected 
more to Member control and oversight given the 
current re-appointment process. The ABM 
selection process is completely Member driven 
and proposed candidates must be perceived as 
being more, in some instances, amenable to a 
legal, philosophical, ideological or jurisprudential 
leaning, in order for them to be considered. In 
other words, the inherent biases must be exposed 
in order for them to be considered by certain 
Members. I think that point was raised early on. 
To counter this, Members can consider, in the 
context of  WTO reform discussions, having a 
single term for ABMs, rather than the current two 
terms; with the second term being subjected to a 
re-appointment process that can be blocked by 
Members. Perhaps a six to eight-year appointment 
without the option of  re-appointment. This would 
reduce the extent to which Appellate Body 
Members would need to consider how their 
decisions will be viewed by Members. And 
parenthetically, while there should be a collective 
responsibility taken by a division for any report 
issued, some WTO Members seem intent to make 
determinations on who may, or may not, have 
influenced the decision. On the other hand, if  
Members would like to preserve a four-year term 
then re-appointment should be automatic failing 
cogent reasons, which may include manifest 
impropriety. A recent example of  this can be 
found in the decision of  the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) not to re-appoint ABMs. 
Automaticity in re-appointment would unshackle 
the hands of  the ABMs and could substantially 
improve their independence. Also, the Members 
of  the Appellate Body should be increased to at 
least nine or perhaps eleven. This would not only 
relieve the strain on the system but would 
significantly allow ABMs to be drawn from 
different countries at different levels of  
development. 
 
Currently, ABMs tend to come from a very 
narrow range of  countries. As I represent a group 
of  small countries, I believe it is really important 
to ensure that there is an Appellate Body that 
represents the diversity of  the WTO Membership. 
Overall, the system works as it allows for all 
Members of  the WTO to be treated equally. 
Indeed, there is an opportunity to strengthen the 
appointment and re-appointment process for 
ABMs but the system does not require a 
fundamental root and branch change. Any change 
towards Member control could very well 
compromise the fundamental fairness of  the 
system. Of  course, one of  the Member States 
which I am honoured to represent, Antigua and 
Barbuda, has proven that the system can be fair.  
In this regard, in the online gambling dispute, 
Antigua and Barbuda, a small country with 
miniscule economic size relative to the US, was 
able to receive a favourable judgement in respect 
of  certain US measures affecting the provision of  
cross-border gambling and betting services.  This 
was a typical David vs Goliath story. However, that 
is not where the story ends. Not only must the 
system be fair in terms of  the outcomes and 
application of  the rules, but resources should be 
provided to allow Members at all levels of  
development to participate effectively.  In 
addition, the system must be reformed in a 
manner that ensures that small Members can 
effectively enforce WTO rulings that have been 
rendered in their favour. 
 
Finally, there must be an approach which ensures 
the interpretation and application of  legal rules 
and principles by a neutral third party. This is what 
the system currently has, and this must be 
preserved while undertaking reforms that render 
the dispute settlement function more effective. 
This is particularly important for small states 
which do not have the economic, financial and 
political strength to influence decisions. And, if  
we move from the system which we currently have 
and to one where power and influence become 
more important than the application of  legal rules 
and principles, the fundamental equity which is 
found within the system, in a sense, would not 
only be compromised but would be disarrayed. 
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Prof. Dr. Petros C. Mavroidis 
 
 
I see a paradox: on the one hand the WTO 
states that it cares about independence, in the 
DSU, from national governments, and I will 
show you why I think it is from national 
governments, and yet practice shows an 
overwhelming recourse to governmental 
panellists, who, in my view, are likelier to 
being influenced by national positions. So, the 
way I understand the issue is that this 
outcome is dictated by overlapping 
preferences between the membership and the 
WTO Secretariat. To prove my argument, I 
will start by asking the question, why does the 
DSU care about independence and 
impartiality? I will try to explain a little about 
the two concepts in WTO law, and show that 
independence should be understood as lack 
of  dependence from government influence, 
whereas impartiality denotes the lack of  
influence from parties to a dispute. I will then 
speak about practice in this area, and then 
evaluate practice in light of  the statutory 
mandate. 
 
Why do we care about this issue? I will answer 
in one sentence: because we want to avoid 
biases. The question, of  course, is which 
biases should we avoid, and the response to 
this question will be the key of  my 
intervention. Independence and impartiality 
have nothing to do with expertise. You can be 
independent and impartial and totally non-
expert. Expertise is not an issue when we 
discuss these concepts. 
 
Let us start with semantics. What do these 
terms mean? The DSU does not mention 
impartiality; it is obliquely mentioned in 
Article 18 (no ex parte communications). The 
context makes me believe that what DSU 
cares about is impartiality from parties to the 
dispute. Independence is discussed more in 
the DSU. It is independence from national 
governments that DSU cares about. Article 
18.3 and 17.3 of  DSU state: no citizens of  
parties to a dispute should adjudicate their 
case, because, the presumption is they will be 
influenced by national positions. Article 8.3 is 
crucial, and independence is crucial, because 
impartiality in and of  itself  does not suffice. 
For example, I could be a New Zealand 
delegate. My country practices zeroing the 
way the US does. I am adjudicating a dispute 
between the US against China on zeroing. 
Since I am a New Zealander who practices 
zeroing like the defendant, I might think twice 
before I decide the issue, since my decision 
will affect my country’s practices. I might be 
impartial but I am not issue-independent. So, 
the DSU correctly includes both an 
impartiality- as well as an independence-
requirement. I need to take distance from my 
national position as well. Of  course, in 
constitutional debate, in domestic 
constitutional debate, those concepts are 
slightly different. Essentially, there, we want 
independence of  the adjudicator from both 
the legislative as well as from the executive. 
Legislative in the WTO would be the WTO 
Membership, and executive would be the 
WTO Secretariat. As I will show you in a 
moment, this is not the independence the 
DSU cares about. The DSU wants to avoid 
judges judging in line with parties' positions, 
that is clear, and in line with national 
positions, and that is also clear. There are 
some contradictions. For example, the DSU 
cares about geographical considerations. Well, 
there might be a trade-off  between geography 
and independence. What if  in one particular 
country, for example, constitution mandates 
that you have to, if  you are a government 
official, follow national positions. 
Independent Secretariat is not an issue in the 
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DSU, otherwise why allow Maria Pereyra who 
is sitting next to me and represents the 
Secretariat, to decide more or less who will be 
the panellists? The DG, at the end of  the day 
if  Maria's recommendations have not been 
accepted by the parties, will decide on the 
composition of  the panel. My work with 
Louise Johanesson, an econometrician from 
Sweden, suggests that, in 61% of  all cases 
until the end of  2016, the DG appointed at 
least one Member of  the Panel. So, obviously, 
the DSU does not care about independence 
from the Secretariat. It presumes it. 
 
There is a DSU preference for independent 
courts. Personally, I am in favour. I see trade-
offs between implementation and intellectual 
integrity of  decisions. There is a study, which 
I was discussing with Niall Meagher over the 
weekend, by Eric Posner, and John Yoo, about 
how dependent courts ease implementation 
of  decisions. What is the idea? The idea is that 
if  we appoint our own judges, the judges, 
knowing the political economy of  the 
appointor, they will know how much the 
appointor can take. The judge will come up 
with decisions which the appointor can 
implement. And the authors cite a lot of  
empirical evidence to this effect. Here we see 
a contradiction in the DSU. Article 3.7 states 
that the preferred solution is implementation. 
If  DSU cares about implementation why does 
it privilege independent courts? If  it cares 
about implementation, it should introduce a 
ISDS-type of  dispute settlement. If  the 
ordinal preference is independence, which I 
share, then the study by Posner & Yoo can be 
side-stepped.  
 
How can we respond to the question to what 
extent in practice does WTO avoid biases? I 
think the starting point should be something 
like this. You look into the identity of  those 
getting the nod to work as panellists, and their 
national positions as well. And then you look 
into the overlap between the panel findings 
and the national positions. So, when you look 
essentially into the question of  issue-
independence, to what extent, in my New 
Zealand example, am I prepared to go against 
my national position? Of  course, you have to 
control for a number of  other variables, but 
what I describe so far would be the brass 
tracks of  the framework to decide to what 
extent WTO de facto avoids biases, not just de 
jure. In practice, I observe that the Secretariat’s 
preferences are in favour of  governmental 
panellists. By Secretariat preferences, I mean 
the identity of  the people that end up 
becoming panellists following 
recommendation by the Secretariat, Legal 
Affairs Division or Rules Division, and then 
eventually completed by the DG. 75% of  all 
panellists, we find in our paper with Louis 
Johansen, between 1995 and 2016, are actual 
or former government officials.  
 
Does this number reflect the WTO 
Membership’s preference? No. Members will 
only approve, and very often not even that 
(when the DG appoints). Membership’s 
preferences are prevalent when it comes to 
the composition of  the Appellate Body. Over 
55% of  all appointments until now, from 
1995 onwards, are government officials. The 
slope goes upwards, if  you look into recent 
years. The current Appellate Body has three 
Members, all former government officials. 
 
So now you will agree with me that it is the 
moment to announce “Houston, we have a 
problem”. If, on the one hand, we want 
independence, and on the other hand we keep 
on appointing governmental officials, then 
there is a prima facie issue of  contradiction and 
inconsistency. Proof  of  dependence is 
impossible. Anonymity of  dissent makes it 
impossible. I know many of  you that work 
here might know who drafted what, but 
outsiders, like myself, will have absolutely no 
idea about who did what. But furthermore, 
even if  you take it from the horse's mouth, 
then we are facing a classic prisoner dilemma: 
judges have absolutely no incentives to explain 
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what the rationale for their decision is, if  the 
rationale for their decision is that they want to 
defend home truths. When I look into 
incentives, quite frankly, you will allow me to 
think that issue-independence is much, much 
likelier when you talk to private agents, than 
when you talk to government officials.  
 
There is a non-government panellist sine-
curve. What do I mean by this? Well, the 
original GATT in the 1940s there was a 
relational contract. You get 23 like-minded 
guys around the table. It was like the 
European Union of  six and nine members. 
You had the top negotiators, people like Dana 
Wilgress from Canada, acting as frequent 
panellists in the first five or six years of  the 
GATT. Over time things changed a lot. The 
GATT started outsourcing expertise, and one 
of  my mentors, if  not my most influential 
mentor, Bob Hudec, always used to say that 
the apex was the DISC dispute. I tend to 
agree with Bob. The DISC is the case that 
changed almost everything. It was the case 
where they appointed three professors of  
economics to act as panellists. Ulrich 
Petersmann, I think, was involved a little bit in 
this case. Two of  the three panelists were 
finance professors, and they highjacked the 
panel process. From that moment onwards, 
everything changed. Of  course, the WTO 
changed as well. Heterogeneity of  
Membership increased. The GATT Legal 
Office was strengthened, and extensive use of  
governmental panellists was encouraged. 
 
What would I do to address the paradox I 
described so far? I cannot tell you too much 
in detail in two minutes, of  course. But I can 
tell you that I do not believe in Goldilocks at 
all. I would not be prepared to make any 
trade-offs between expertise and anything 
else. In my view, the prime quality of  judges 
should be expertise. I would strengthen 
conflict clauses as well. I would make sure 
these guys are employees only of  the WTO 
and no one else. I would not like to see judges 
or panellists work for other people. I like 
permanent judges, for one, non-renewable 
appointment. Why all of  this? Because as 
Richard Haas,  from Council on Foreign 
Relations, in a 2016 book on International 
Relations has mentioned “one factor 
increasing the odds that the world order will 
survive is that it does not require talented 
statesmen, the supply which is likely to be 
insufficient.” This is the best statement I 
know in favour of  institutions and against 
trusting distinct individuals. 
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Mr Niall Meagher 
 
 
Ultimately, I agree with the Chair that the 
discussion actually goes beyond independence 
and impartiality because, I really think those 
are a sort of  a given. In preparing for this 
session, I found a nice quote about judicial 
independence from the US Supreme Court 
Judge Stephen Breyer who wrote about a 
cultural expectation of  judges to behave 
independently, to decide cases according to 
the law, and the facts,  despite the pressure of  
political sponsors or popular opinion. Justice 
Breyer said that judicial independence is in 
part a state of  mind, a matter of  expectation, 
habit and belief, not just among judges, 
lawyers and legislators, but also the people. I 
think that expectation applies also in WTO 
dispute settlement. That is the culture, the 
expectation we have, that panels and the 
Appellate Body Members are going to act 
independently and with impartiality. I will be 
coming back in a minute to how panel 
members and Appellate Body Members are 
service providers. I think the service that we 
are hiring them to provide is their expertise 
and also their independence and impartiality. 
If  we don't want independence and 
impartiality, we would just have advocates. I 
suppose some of  you might argue that the 
arbitrators are a lot cheaper than the 
advocates, so maybe we can get rid of  the 
advocates and just have the arbitrators do 
everything.  But I know that some in the 
room don't want to go down that road in the 
discussion! 
 
I think it important to broaden the current 
discussion beyond the Appellate Body.  We 
are also talking about who the panelists 
should be and how they should approach their 
work. We are really hiring them for the 
purpose of  their expertise, independence, and 
impartiality.  The paper by Professors Eric 
Posner and John Yoo to which Petros 
Mavroidis referred  talks about the difference 
between "dependent" and "independent" 
judges or arbitrators, where "dependent" 
judges would be more like the GATT process 
or maybe the current WTO panel situation, 
and "independent" would be more like how 
we perceive Appellate Body Members. I think 
that paper is well worth reading.1  I disagree 
with its conclusion that dependent arbitrators 
are better with respect to implementation of  
decisions, because I think one of  the 
underestimated benefits of  the Appellate 
Body has been the extent to which it further 
persuades to losing members to comply. The 
incentives to comply, or at least the political 
argument about compliance in the losing 
Member, are very different when the losing 
Member has lost not once, but twice. And the 
sheer repetition and additional clarity 
provided by the Appellate Body as to why the 
losing Member lost provides a value that I 
think is not sufficiently not taken into account 
by the Posner paper, but certainly should be 
maintained going forward. 
 
I would like to come back to the notion of  
arbitrators as service providers. This is 
something we can all relate to, because every 
single one of  us in the room is, in fact, a 
service provider. When we are talking about 
hiring service providers, there are two main 
questions: who are you going to get to 
provide the service; and secondly what service 
are they going to provide. With respect to the 
"who" part of  this, I would largely defer to 
what Petros Mavroidis has just said and the 
                                                          
1 Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, Judicial 
Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1 (2005). 
9 | W H A T  K I N D  O F  D I S P U T E  S E T T L E M E N T  F O R  T H E  W T O ?  
 
issues he raised.  I would simply  note that 
you have an additional complication at the 
Appellate Body stage, given that because there 
is a smaller and fixed number of  Appellate 
Body Members than panelists, it would seem 
to me more important to try to avoid a 
political selection process. Whether that is 
feasible going forward, given geographical and 
other concerns, I am not sure. But the extent 
to which the selection process could be more 
merit based, I think that would be certainly an 
improvement on how, going forward, we 
decide "who" these service providers are 
going to be. 
 
We then come to the question of  "what" 
service we are asking the arbitrators to 
provide.  Here, we would all agree that as 
service providers, what we really want is clear 
instructions. It is a lot easier to provide the 
service you are asked to provide when you 
know exactly what is expected of  you. And, 
here, I think it is worth a discussion because 
there is at least a perception that perhaps the 
instructions we are giving panel members and 
Appellate Body members are not clear 
enough. One could argue that Article 3.2 of  
the DSU is perfectly clear. Nevertheless, we 
have to recognize that it is a little more 
complicated than that. If  the texts were so 
clear, perhaps we wouldn't even have disputes 
in the first place. But, the reason why we have 
disputes and the reasons why we have panels 
and the Appellate Body is, as you know, 
because if  you have two lawyers in a room, 
you have at least three or four opinions. That 
is why we have dispute settlement and that is 
why we give instructions to arbitrators, and 
that is why the instructions need to be as clear 
as they possibly can. I don't think we should 
be surprised or embarrassed that there should 
be  an ongoing debate as to what exactly are 
the instructions to arbitrators and how these 
instructions are to be implemented.  This 
debate has been mission.  I think we have to 
be sensitive also that this debate is not about 
winning and losing cases, it is about how we 
go about the exercise of  arbitrating these 
disputes. We come from very many different 
legal cultures, in many parts of  the globe, and 
we have to be able to discuss in an ongoing 
and reasonable manner, divorced from the 
outcome of  particular disputes, how we go 
about this exercise. My own experience as an 
arbitrator is fairly limited, but those of  you 
who have more experience will know that 
when you are arbitrating, it is hard not to 
please 50% of  the people involved. These are 
the winners.  However, it is extremely hard to 
please more than 50%, by also pleasing the 
losers. And so, the task, as I see it, should be 
how do we go about giving sufficiently clear 
instructions to arbitrators, so that they have a 
decent chance in their work of  pleasing, to 
the extent possible, more than 50% of  the 
people sitting before them by ensuring that 
the losers respect and accept the outcome. 
 
I would like to finish by coming back to the 
discussion at the end about accountability. 
There is a trade-off  between independence 
and accountability.  However, I don't really see 
this as a huge issue in the WTO. In many 
domestic jurisdictions where judges have life-
time terms, accountability becomes a big 
issue. Here, in the WTO, there is no 
suggestion that anyone should have anything 
remotely resembling a life-time term.  Thus, 
the accountability already exists to the extent 
that the means of  just changing the arbitrators 
is already built in.  In any event, I think the 
best way to ensure that you don't need to 
exercise accountability is to give arbitrators  
clear instructions and tell them more clearly 
what it is we expect from them. Then, their 
independence, impartiality, and expertise kick 
in and we should just let them get on with the 
job. 
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Ms María J. Pereyra 
 
 
Article 8 of  the DSU requires the Secretariat 
to assist the parties in appointing the panelists. 
In other words, the Secretariat proposes 
names of  candidates to the parties because 
the DSU asks us to do so. We take the names 
of  the candidates from our databases, 
including the indicative list of  panelists. This 
list includes those names put forward by the 
WTO Members to the DSB as potential 
panelists. Even though some delegates have 
on occasion indicated that the Secretariat does 
not use the official indicative list when 
suggesting names, we are very attentive to the 
names proposed by the Members. I take this 
opportunity to kindly ask the Members to 
update their contributions to the indicative 
list, and if  you (the Members) include more 
women in your list, it would be most 
welcome!  
 
With respect to how the panel composition 
process works in practice, after the 
establishment of  a panel in a particular 
dispute, the Secretariat will contact the parties 
to ask whether they wish to proceed with the 
composition of  the panel. If  the parties are 
ready to proceed, the Secretariat will meet 
with the parties to obtain their preferred 
criteria. As indicated before, it is according to 
these criteria that we will propose names of  
candidates.  
 
Over time, parties have asked that the 
panelists be former or current government 
officials. They may even ask the Secretariat to 
propose former Ministers or Ambassadors to 
the WTO. This is why, when the parties ask 
for candidates with prior panel experience, 
those candidates have tended to be former or 
current government officials.  
 
Parties always ask for people who have prior 
experience in panel adjudication, making the 
scope of  potential candidates smaller. If  we 
can, we try to put forward what we call 
"newbies", including female newbies, to be 
selected so that we may increase the pool of  
candidates with prior panel experience. We 
locate new names by going to our databases 
or other sources, even social media, to try to 
"fish for fresh blood".  
 
Sometimes the process is very complicated 
because of  conflicting criteria put forward by 
the parties. For instance, you may have one 
party telling you "I want someone coming 
from a landlocked country" and the other 
party telling you "I don't want anyone from a 
landlocked country".  
 
Parties often oppose pure academics but 
would consider academics with prior 
Secretariat experience, or academics with prior 
private or government practice. Parties 
frequently ask for candidates with a legal 
background, and lately, some Members are 
asking for gender balance, which is close to 
my heart. We are trying to get that! 
 
In addition to respecting the criteria 
submitted by the parties, we try to ensure the 
independence and impartiality of  the 
candidates that we put forward. But we are 
the Secretariat: we do not have the means that 
Members may possess to check the 
candidates' backgrounds. Lately, because we 
have had some very controversial cases where 
the measures at issue are very much in the 
public eye, we proceeded to check what some 
of  the candidates have said on social media. It 
is remarkable the enormous amount of  time 
that some of  my colleagues and I have spent 
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reading through social media. For example, I 
spent at least one day reading through a blog 
on constitutional law. It was very interesting. 
And when I was thinking that I had read 
enough, I nevertheless decided to go through 
the statements in 2016. The first entry I saw 
was a very blatant statement about certain 
representatives of  one of  the parties. Of  
course, this person could not be considered 
independent. So, if  you want to be a panelist, 
beware what you say, beware what you post 
on social media, because the Secretariat will 
look at that. 
 
One thing I should say is that, at the stage of  
selecting candidates to put forward to the 
parties, we do not contact those potential 
candidates. At that stage, we ignore whether 
they may have a conflict of  interest further 
than what we can see on their CVs or social 
media. For instance, we would look at the list 
of  publications for the academics or 
published speeches for governmental officials. 
But sometimes we do not possess enough 
information. It will only be when the parties 
have agreed on the three names that we would 
check with the candidates whether they have a 
conflict of  interest and go back to the parties. 
We send the candidates the WTO Rules of  
Conduct, stress the list of  items that they 
should disclose, and ask the candidates to sign 
a disclosure form. Notably, we will not 
announce a composition to the parties and to 
the Membership before we have received the 
disclosure forms completed and signed by the 
selected candidates. 
 
The Secretariat's efforts of  ensuring the 
impartiality and independence of  panelists has 
been made harder because, in certain recent 
disputes, the Secretariat has not been given 
the opportunity to put forward any names of  
candidates to the parties. Some Members have 
decided, after the initial meeting at which they 
present their criteria to the Secretariat, to go 
directly to the Director-General to request 
that he compose the panel. In this situation, it 
is more difficult for us (the Secretariat) to help 
in ensuring impartiality and independence of  
potential panelists because we do not have the 
means to run a thorough background on 
those candidates; we do not have a "secret 
service" to check on what everybody does, 
apart from what is available in the media.  
 
Once the Director-General receives the 
request that he compose a particular panel, he 
will meet with the parties. The parties provide 
him with their criteria – which tend to be 
more stringent than the criteria provided at 
the Secretariat level – and then the Director-
General will have to figure out whom to 
select. The Secretariat assists the Director-
General by providing him with names of  
candidates and researching their backgrounds. 
The Director-General will then take his own 
informed decision.  
 
Ensuring the impartiality and independence 
of  potential panelists is difficult at the 
Director-General stage. The short deadline of  
10 days provided in Article 8.7 of  the DSU 
reduces the time available for the Secretariat 
to research the candidates' backgrounds for 
possible conflicts. The confidentiality of  the 
process does not allow the Secretariat to 
inform shortlisted candidates that they are 
being considered for a given case. Sometimes 
we may contact prospective shortlisted 
candidates to ascertain their availability 
without disclosing the case at hand. It is 
therefore not possible for us to ascertain 
whether there is any conflict of  interest or any 
other issue affecting the impartiality or 
independence of  a candidate. Unlike at the 
Secretariat level, the Secretariat cannot 
provide the parties with lists of  candidates 
that the Director-General may have 
shortlisted. It is therefore not possible to 
benefit from the parties' larger capabilities for 
researching a candidate's' background.  
 
Perhaps you, the Members, can help us by 
updating the indicative list, proposing names 
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or by not always going to the Director-
General. It is in the interest of  Members and 
parties to try to keep the process at the 
Secretariat level, so that the parties have the 
possibility of  checking the background of  
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Comments, Questions and Answers following Session 1 
 
Comment by Prof. Dr. Ulrich Petersmann 
 
We should come back to the question - 
raised in the beginning and not answered by 
any of the panel members - regarding the 
adequate regulation of the relationship 
between the judicial branch and the political 
branch of the WTO. This question is 
important because the current ‘WTO 
Appellate Body crisis’ is related to what the 
United States perceives as legitimacy deficits 
of the ‘judicialization’ and inadequate, 
political control of WTO jurisprudence. The 
independence and impartiality of WTO 
adjudicators – i.e. the subject of this panel 
discussion - are not only about avoiding 
external influence and related bias; the 
‘Rules of Conduct’ for the DSU, for 
instance, specify additional judicial duties 
(like confidentiality and ‘integrity’ 
requirements, self-disclosure of conflicts of 
interests, prohibition of ex parte 
communications) and judicial 
responsibilities (e.g. of legal expertise, non-
delegation of certain judicial tasks) as 
defining elements of the separation of 
political, administrative and judicial 
functions in WTO law (as prescribed in 
Article III of the WTO Agreement). These 
‘institutional choice’, legitimacy and 
accountability constraints of WTO law are 
important also for the two separate 
functions of WTO dispute settlement 
bodies. Their dispute settlement function to 
apply the existing law - as politically 
approved by parliaments and governments – 
independently and impartially to the dispute 
concerned so as to settle it in conformity 
with the customary rules of treaty 
interpretation and of ‘due process of law’ is 
different from their systemic rule-
clarification function. As trade diplomats 
designed the WTO Agreement as an 
‘incomplete agreement’ full of indeterminate 
provisions, the judicial mandate granted by 
governments and national parliaments to 
WTO dispute settlement bodies to clarify 
this deliberate, ‘constructive ambiguity’ for 
deciding the dispute and related 
interpretative disagreements entails 
‘cognitive challenges’ as well as ‘institutional 
choice’ problems, to which judicial 
reasoning may have to respond differently 
from political reasoning by governments. 
This prospective, systemic function of the 
‘WTO dispute settlement system’ for 
‘providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system’ by clarifying ‘the 
existing provisions of those agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’ is 
explicitly mandated in Article 3 DSU. It has 
nothing to do with the different, political 
WTO function of law-making, 
notwithstanding the legal obligation of 
WTO panels to take into account 
established WTO jurisprudence approved 
by the DSB ‘in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading 
system’. The legitimacy of this systemic rule-
clarification function derives, primarily, 
from the democratic mandate given by 
parliaments when they approved WTO law 
and its quasi-judicial mandate for WTO 
dispute settlement adjudication. The 
independence and impartiality of WTO 
dispute settlement bodies, and the persistent 
approval of their jurisprudence by the DSB 
and by the global ‘external WTO 
community’, provide additional justification 
of ‘judicial public reason’.  
 
The DSU’s institutionalization - in the DSB 
- of permanent dialogue between the judicial 
and political branches (e.g. discussing and 
adopting panel and appellate reports) is 
unique in the international legal system. Yet, 
the US criticism of the ‘judicialization’ of 
WTO jurisprudence points to the need for 
further developing this ‘institutionalized 
dialogue’, for instance by establishing a 
permanent, inclusive DSB Legal Committee 
assisting the DSB in identifying, evaluating 
and remedying controversial elements in 
WTO jurisprudence (e.g. so as to correct 
unconvincing judicial interpretations of 
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WTO rules on safeguard, antidumping and 
countervailing measures by agreed 
‘authoritative interpretations’). 
Unfortunately, WTO diplomats have never 
taken up academic proposals to institute 
such a Legal Committee in the DSB, which 
should discuss and evaluate all panel, AB 
and arbitration reports (e.g. by telling the 
judicial branch: ‘This is something we don't 
find convincing – we disagree with the 
zeroing methodology’). Such professional 
advice from a Legal Committee could 
strengthen the DSB’s dialogue with the 
judicial branch on ‘providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading 
system’. The recent EU proposal for 
reinforcing this dialogue is a better approach 
to strengthening the political legitimacy of 
the WTO dispute settlement system than 
the illegal US obstruction of the filling of 
AB vacancies and of the democratic 
mandates given by parliaments to 
implement and reform, but not to destroy 
the WTO dispute settlement system. The 
persistent violation by the DSB, since 2017, 
of its legal and democratic mandates (e.g. in 
Articles 3, 17, 23 DSU) to protect the AB 
system undermines the legitimacy of the 
WTO more seriously than the 
‘judicialization’ of the WTO legal system 
driven by complaints from WTO members 
and by their collective ‘governance failures’ 
to adapt WTO rules to new regulatory 
challenges.  
 
Question by Mr James Flett 
The title of the Session is how to ensure 
independence. I thought it was interesting 
that about 80% of the comments were really 
about why independence is important, 
which is actually a different question. I do 
think the panel did a good job of identifying 
why there are particular features of the 
WTO that make independence and 
impartiality so important. I think the panel 
made four excellent points. The first was, I 
think, a point made by Ms Nordin, that 
there is a small number of repeat players. If 
I had a big red button on my desk which I 
could press and that would mean the EU 
would win every dispute from that point 
onwards, I would not press it, because that 
would destroy the system. So, we are repeat 
players and we care about balance in the 
system. This is very important and it makes 
the WTO different from other legal systems 
and other legal contexts. And it makes it 
particularly important that the adjudicators 
are independent and impartial. 
 
The second one is, I think, the one that 
Niall mentioned, the obvious one, which is 
the significant ambiguity in the WTO 
treaties. Again, that is what makes it 
incredibly important that we have 
confidence in the adjudicators to apply the 
set of instructions in the Vienna 
Convention, and to strive for independence 
and impartiality. Again, this is a particularity 
of the WTO legal system, because it 
involves countries that are so different from 
each other, striving to reach an agreement. 
With an imperative to reach an agreement. 
That is what inevitably creates the 
ambiguities. And that is why we have to 
trust our judges. And that is why we need 
them to be independent and impartial. 
Again, a second particular feature of the 
WTO system. 
 
The third, which Mr Stephen Fevrier 
mentioned, is the small states point. We 
have subjects of the law who are 
enormously different in terms of the power 
that they have, the trade power that they 
have. This is another particular feature of 
the WTO system that makes it 
overwhelmingly important that the 
adjudicators are independent and impartial.  
 
Another, the fourth, is what I think a 
number of contributors mentioned, namely 
the absence of an executive, and 
consequently the nature of the judicial 
function, which is constitutional in nature, 
that is, an interpretative function. And so, it 
is not about deference to an executive, it is 
about finding the answer that best fits the 
riddle or the cypher that is the Vienna 
Convention.  
 
So, four reasons, of which I think that the 
panel has done an excellent job of 
reminding us, why independence and 
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impartiality is important, not only just 
because it is a legal system, but because of 
the very particular characteristics of the 
WTO system. I mention those four that 
absolutely demand the independence and 
impartiality of the adjudicators, if the system 
is to survive and prosper.  
 
And here is my question. Some Members 
have been discussing and some academic 
discussions have been going on about using 
Article 25 of the DSU, so that those 
Members who wish to continue with dispute 
settlement based on an independent and 
impartial set of adjudicators, including at a 
second level, at an appellate level, can use 
Article 25 to reach agreements between 
themselves in order to do that. So, here is 
my question to the panel: if those Members 
who are like-minded go down that road and 
they want to keep accessing what Niall 
correctly referred to as the 'service', how 
important is it to maintain independence 
and impartiality in that context, if we use the 
model of Article 25? Does it remain as 
important as it would be if we continue with 
the existing system? And, if so, what are the 
critical things that need to be achieved in 
order to ensure that at the appellate level we 
continue to have independence and 
impartiality. Who should those ad hoc 
adjudicators be? Who should appoint them? 
And who should provide secretarial support 
to them? I would suggest former members 
of the AB appointed according to the 
existing arrangements and supported by the 
existing appellate body secretariat. And I 
would like to hear from the panel whether 




Answer by Mr Fevrier, Mr Meagher and 
Prof. Dr. Marceau 
 
Mr Fevrier 
In the absence of concrete progress and 
finding a solution for the current impasse, 
log jam, in the system, there is one that can 
be considered. However, if you mean a 
plurilateral application of DSU, it will 
undermine the efficacy of the rules 
themselves, how can the multilateral system 
and the rules which are developed apply and 
be enforceable by only Members who 
subject themselves to the process. My fear is 
that it would fundamentally undermine not 
only the DS system, but also the rule-
making body, legislative function, of the 
WTO. It is a resort which I think should be 
avoided at all costs, given the impact it 
would have not only on the application of 
the rules, the creation of the rules, but also 
the way adjudication takes place. Because, in 
that context some Members would 
effectively be outside the system of the 
system of the dispute settlement. If my 
understanding of the question is correct, I 
think it is a resort that should be avoided, 
given the impact it would have not only on 
the adjudication and adjudicatory function, 




With respect to James question on Article 
25, I think I would agree with what Stephen 
has said, but James’ question also seems to 
imply that recourse to a new methodology 
under Article 25 might not be independent 
or impartial. I am not quite sure what the 
basis for that is.of that would be. I suppose 
it depends on the mechanics of how it 
would works. But, it seems to me that if 
independence and impartiality are is an 
important feature of the current system, 
then you would also want to value them it 
any alternative system, because as we know, 
in life, once we move to alternatives, then 
the alternatives become the status quo, and 
become then that would be what you are 
left with going forward. Just to come back 
to what Professor Petersmann said briefly, 
about a legal committee, I think that would 
be is valuable and is what is I was trying to 
get at when talking about the need to be 
able to clarify the instructions, and clarify 
what it is we expect from panelists and the 
appellate body. , which I don't think is 
necessarily a legislative function as such, or 
an executive function. It is largely a 
technical issue regarding the operation of 
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the DS process and is something that’s best 
done away from the heat of individual cases, 
and, also with all due respect to James, by 
broadening the discussion out from the 
regular users, who tend to get caught up in 
their own disputes. The current mechanism 
for this is supposed to be the DSB 
statements by Members on the adoptions of 
reports. But theose are not very useful, I 
think. I know that Members of the AB have 
told me in the past that they pay careful 
attention to them, but they may not be 
entirely fruitful because we know what those 
statements are going to say. The winning 
party is going to say that the report is a 
brilliant exercise in a narrow legal judicial 
interpretation of the textsrms, and the losing 
party is going to say it is a massive exercise 
in over-reach, or under-reach, or some other 
kind of bad reach. I do think that we need 
to move away from, or have some sort of 
mechanism where, on a technical level and 
not based on expectation with respect to 
particular cases, there can be some sort of 
discussion and feedback on what it means 
for panels and the Aappellate Bbody to do a 
good job. 
 
Comment from Prof. Dr. Gabrielle Marceau 
 
This comment is in my personal capacity. 
Whether Members use an arbitration system 
ad hoc, a new one or whatever other 
adjudication system, I believe that, the 
Members decided that all adjudicators in the 
WTO dispute settlement system are subject 
to the WTO Code of ethics, now called the 
WTO Rules of conduct, which are, I 
believe, among the most extensive and 
comprehensive set of rules on 
the  impartiality, independence, 
confidentiality and conflict of interest of 
adjudicators. So, Members could decide to 
do otherwise, but a priori whatever system 
under Article 25 of the DSU on arbitration, 
it would bind arbitrators and oblige them to 
also be independent and impartial and 
without conflict, etc. because of the Rules 
on Conduct adopted early on under Article 
11 of the DSU. 
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Chair: H.E. Mr Roberto Zapata Barradas, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico to 
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Before I discuss the subject of  this panel, I'll 
just spend a moment commenting on the so-
called crisis in dispute settlement.  
I'm not sure whether it is a crisis, perhaps that 
word is a little bit overused. One of  the 
drivers I understand is a perception that more 
needs to be done with respect to certain 
Members. I'm not sure personally that I see 
the logical connection between that 
observation and rendering the dispute 
settlement system dysfunctional. It seems to 
me that the rules-based system provides an 
opportunity for us all to coexist together, and 
that includes using the system to constrain 
Members that one perceives as acting outside 
the bounds of  behaviour that is considered 
acceptable. So I think there's a non sequitur 
there, I think there's a disconnect.  
The other driver, as we all know, I think, the 
other enabling feature, is a certain concern in 
trade remedies, especially about so-called 
judicial overreach. I don't want to get into 
that. I think it's old-fashioned exceptionalism. 
You win some, you lose some. I think those 
judgments are perfectly acceptable and one 
has to move on.  
My final point is, the thing about Article 25 of  
the DSU is that it does provide an entirely 
non-aggressive way for the rest of  the 
membership, who wish to continue by 
benefitting mutually from the services of  
independent, impartial, and objective dispute 
settlement, to do so, and why should they not 
have the opportunity to do that? If  we really 
believe in the mutual benefits of  that system, 
then, over time, that will be demonstrated and 
there may be room for reconsideration on the 
part of  others.  
So, in the words of  Tom Hanks, that's all I 
have to say about that. 
To come to the topic of  this panel, I was 
struck when I read, immediately, in the title, 
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"how to balance prompt settlement and 
adequate or satisfactory settlement", that there 
is an assumption that we have to make a 
choice.  I don't want to make a choice because 
I am greedy, and I like what it says in the 
DSU. It says in the DSU that we can have 
both, and I want both. I want prompt 
settlement, and I want satisfactory settlement, 
both of  which are provided for in the DSU. 
So, I'm not really interested in balance in that 
sense. As you can see, I don't have any slides, 
but I do have a handout, which I've passed 
around, so that you can have a look at the 
structure of  what I want to say. I do think 
there are some particularities of  the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System that make me 
wonder whether or not it was always destined 
to be a bit of  a bottleneck. Perhaps it's just 
ambitious to think that all of  the disputes that 
can arise in this field of  public international 
economic law, could really be resolved in one 
place. And I do think the system is suffering 
from overload, everybody is feeling that 
overload. And when you think about prompt 
settlement and satisfactory settlement, and 
that's point two on the handout, and you 
think about a whole series of  issues that have 
been played out in the case law, sometimes in 
considerable detail, often lying behind all of  
those debates, is an attempt to find a 
compromise or a balance between prompt 
settlement on the one hand and satisfactory 
settlement on the other hand. Now, it just so 
happens that I think the system has done a 
pretty reasonable job of  finding a balance, but 
my point is that these are all symptoms. These 
are all symptoms of  overload, actually. It's the 
overload that is driving people to say, "well, 
we have to find some sort of  compromise 
between prompt settlement and satisfactory 
settlement." And that overload, I think, is, in 
turn, connected with the design and 
architecture of  the system:  the proposition 
that all of  these global trade disputes could 
actually be processed through one place. As 
you can see in points three and four of  the 
handout, I have some doubts that we can 
really address this problem through what I call 
docket control techniques or through changes 
in practice and how the system runs. I think 
the problem is a bit more fundamental than 
that, and a bit more structural. And that 
brings me to the fifth point, which is an 
observation about the European Court of  
Justice. Now of  course, that's my, in a sense, 
my municipal law court, but it's also an 
international court in its own right. Those 
familiar with European Union law will know 
the secret of  the success of  the European 
Court of  Justice is its decentralization of  
European law. European law is interpreted 
and applied by national judges in Member 
States of  the European Union, across the 
European Union. And this has been 
absolutely key in it being effective and it being 
accepted. And so, my question is, if  this is the 
critical aspect of  the success of  the European 
Court of  Justice, isn't it worth at least thinking 
about how the continuing success of  the 
WTO dispute settlement system, might or 
might not also learn some lessons from that? 
And at least ask ourselves the question about 
the decentralization of  WTO law, by which I 
mean, quite simply, the question of  whether 
or not judicial authorities all over the world 
are paying attention to WTO law, to the 
treaties, to clarifications provided by the 
Appellate Body, one way or another. Are we 
interested in this problem at all? Are we just 
indifferent to it? Do we think it's a good 
thing? Do we think it's a bad thing? And then, 
I'm asking the question, what actually are the 
benefits and risks of  decentralization in this 
sense? And I can see some benefits. I mean, 
the dissemination of  WTO law, the fact that it 
would be applied very widely. Critically, one 
of  the points I'm making is access to 
resources. Many of  the covered agreements 
actually refer to judicial processes in the 
Member States, in the Members of  the WTO. 
Are we really paying attention to these 
provisions and thinking about what they 
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might mean? And there are various other 
bullet points there, you can read them for 
yourselves. A certain element of  trust, some 
sense of  judicial comity. Of  course national 
courts might have a tendency to favour 
national interests, but are we really saying that 
we have no faith and trust at all in judicial 
authorities, in WTO Members? Political 
authorities, maybe, is one thing. What about 
judicial authorities? Can we talk to them?  
Obviously, there are certain risks. The need to 
ensure control and coherence, and, obviously 
those familiar with EU law will immediately 
say, "well the bit of  the mechanism that's not 
there is the mandatory reference for 
preliminary rulings for interpreting WTO 
law." Well, sure, there's nothing in the DSU 
about that. But is that really an end of  the 
discussion? Are there other ways in which that 
process could be managed from the bottom 
up? For example, if  litigants in the European 
Court of  Justice, with respect to a particular 
measure, are exchanging argument about the 
meaning of  WTO law, why couldn't the 
European Court of  Justice ask the EU to 
bring that case into the WTO using standard 
or special terms of  reference to obtain an 
interpretation, and then pay some attention to 
that? I just think that there's a lot of  reflection 
that needs to be done, and perhaps some 
imagination that needs to be used. And that's 
the sixth point, what are the existing tools that 
could be used to achieve some measure of  
decentralization? And I'm not talking about 
imposing it. I'm not suggesting that on the 
basis of  XVI:4 of  the WTO Agreement, the 
Appellate Body should have pronounced the 
unique nature of  WTO law, its supremacy, 
and direct effect throughout the legal orders 
of  the Members of  the WTO. I'm not 
suggesting that, of  course. But I am asking 
the question, are we really completely 
indifferent to this issue? 
Just to give an example, there have been some 
cases where defendants in WTO law, I'm 
thinking particularly of  Mexico, have argued 
that, because they give direct effect to WTO 
law in their jurisdiction, that is something that 
needs to be taken into account when thinking 
about whether or not ambiguous national 
measures should be found, as such, 
inconsistent with WTO law. And they've been 
unsuccessful in those arguments. The 
adjudicators have not been very impressed by 
them. And so I suppose I'm pressing the 
pause button and I'm saying maybe we should 
think about that. Why don't we think it’s a 
good thing that Mexico gives direct effect to 
WTO law? Is that a good thing? And if  it is a 
good thing, what do we have to say about it? 
Are there ways in which we can give it credit? 
Are there ways in which we can incentivize? 
And you can see there are some other 
questions there, on the handout, not just 
about direct effect, but for example, about 
interpretation in conformity. That is, the 
proposition that, in a municipal jurisdiction, 
you should have a rule which says that, to the 
greatest extent possible, municipal law should 
be interpreted so as to render it in conformity 
with WTO law. Some members have such a 
rule that functions. Other members may not, 
or may not have the rule functioning in such a 
clear way. Are we indifferent to that? Do we 
care? Or do we tend to think that, if  members 
have a functioning interpretation in 
conformity rule, that's a good thing. And if  
it's a good thing, what can we do in order to 
incentivize or encourage it? In short, what I'm 
inviting us to do is to exercise collectively our 
imagination and to try and think about how 
WTO law and municipal law can work 
together or be made to work together, in 
order to get to the place that we want to be.  
So, I want to be clear, this is a response to 
overload. And overload itself, isn't it just a 
function of  the way the design and 
architecture of  the system has been 
understood up to this point? Is it really 
possible to process all of  the future cases 
through the bottleneck that is here at the 
WTO? Or do we need to really start thinking 
about and having a conversation about the 
benefits and risks of  decentralization and how 
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it might be achieved using the existing tools 
that we have?  
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Dr. Christian Häberli 
 
This is a basically an academic conference 
assembling stakeholders in the triangle 
relevant for solving the WTO DS crisis i.e. 
Panelists, Delegates, and Negotiators. I was 
privileged to wear all these different hats for 
decades. In my intervention I will argue that 
the two notions for this Second Session – 
“prompt” and “adequate” – are simply non-
issues, whereas the real challenge is for all 
adjudicators to avoid what is now called 
“overreach”. 
First, what is meant by “prompt” (Art.3.3 
DSU)? 
My first case was on bananas. “Bananas III”, 
actually, and it alone took 16 years to 
conclude with a mutually agreed solution. 
Interestingly, the solution was not found 
pursuant to Article 3.6 of the DSU nor in any 
of the three banana panels but by the only 
twice invoked good offices available under 
Article 5 DSU. 
So how fast is “prompt”? If this was Chatham 
House, I could probably provide examples of, 
shall we say procedural dilly-dallying, for each 
of the Member delegates present today. The 
same goes for the many Law Firms present 
today – except of course those we kicked out 
of this very room in the first bananas panel. 
I could not even say that complainants were 
faster and more hard-working than 
respondents! But this is not a blame game. 
Today we are looking for solutions to a crisis. 
Let me then simply state this: in each and 
every case the priorities of the parties between 
“prompt” and “adequate” settlement were 
clear. I have never heard a Party or a Third 
Party offering to work faster, to ask less 
questions, let alone to accept less “adequacy”. 
Nonetheless, looking at the deadlines it seems 
to me that the negotiators forgot that we are 
all humans. Meaning they forgot the existence 
of weekends, and of national and religious 
holidays as a negotiating issue in the first 
organisational meeting with the parties. 
Hence, “prompt” settlement is a non-issue. 
Second, the DSU insists, twice, on “adequate 
opportunity for consultation.”2 
So what is “adequate”? 
My last case was COOL, and it went through 
the whole rhapsody of compliance, appeal, 
and authorisation of suspension of 
concessions. Our Arbitration Report was 
circulated 7 years after the Request for 
Consultations; within a record 10 days the 
incriminated measure was then repealed by 
the same respondent’s parliament. Nobody 
said it was un-prompt or inadequate. But 
some said the US Government was only too 
happy to abolish its own, poor regulation! 
Perhaps this shows, again, that “adequate” 
(settlement) lies in the eye of the beholder – 
and that it can be obtained with due time and 
diligence! 
Where is the problem? 
I think the main challenge for adjudicators is 
to interpret WTO disciplines and 
commitments without what has come to be 
called “overreach”. All adjudicators must learn 
how to determine for each disputed issue 
precisely how much text interpretation is 
necessary without straying into the infamous 
area of “rule making”. 
Clearly, there is a grey zone here, especially 
under extremely tight time constraints. 
Criticism, albeit self-serving, is often justified 
– but many critics omit that the adjudicators 
must find a “positive solution”.3 Now 
suppose that an adjudicator, after affording 
everybody “adequate” consultations, cannot 
reach a “prompt” and “positive” solution 
without trespassing the rule-making taboo. 
Could she – or does he have to – decline to 
issue a finding and refer the specific matter 
                                                          
2 Articles 4.2 (Parties) and 11 (Panels) 
3 On the one side ‘[r]ecommendations and rulings of  
the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements’ 
(Art.3.2 DSU). On the other side ‘[t]he aim of  the 
dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive 
solution to a dispute’ (Art.3.7 DSU). 
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back to the DSB?4 I think the question of 
“overreach” would deserve to be clarified. 
In the Biotech Panel we took 3,5 years to issue 
what is perhaps the longest Report in WTO 
DS history. Some of you may remember the 
scientific expert consultations - by which the 
proceedings lasted almost one year longer. 
(And you might have wondered whether this 
was not a useless exercise risking to turn 
WTO into a science court!) As an additional 
detail perhaps of interest here, we also had to 
read 20 books and articles to outline in a 
footnote our view on the applicability of the 
Vienna Convention – a threshold issue for the 
applicability of the UN Biodiversity 
Convention and the Cartagena Protocol. Now 
I ask you: this Panel Report was not appealed 
(but it was accused by many of 
“overreaching”). Does this mean that our 
footnote which hardly anyone noticed is now 
part of WTO Case Law? 
When adopting the Tuna III Compliance 
Report the US said in the last DSB that it was 
“disappointed that it has taken more than a 
decade to resolve this matter.” The US also 
complained that this required enormous 
human resources, which poorer countries 
could not afford. In the same statement, the 
US acknowledges that “[T]his thorough and 
painstaking factual analysis by the Panels was 
the basis for their correct factual and legal 
conclusions concerning the dolphin safe 
labelling measure and for the Appellate 
Body’s upholding all the Panels’ findings.” 
Actually, the US was clearly very happy to 
find itself in the rare position of a winning 
respondent – especially after the AB bent over 
backward and invented the term “calibrated” 
to find TBT compliance. No “overreach” was 
alleged here - never mind the fact that the 
almighty AB virtually closed the door to TBT-
Article 2.2 claims! 
Finally, I also submit that dispute settlement 
has become what I would call “over-
judicialised”. This is not an academic exercise! 
                                                          
4 Nothing in the DSU allows a Panel, or the AB, to 
decline to fulfil their mandate. Nor does the DSU 
prevent adjudicators from doing so. 
We have lost the first and preferred leg in the 
DSU which is to find mutually agreed 
solutions through “sympathetic 
consideration”, “adequate” consultations and 
out-of-court settlements. Most parties seem to 
have forgotten that avenue; some even want 
to prevent the AB from issuing advisory 
opinions. And insiders know how difficult it is 
to make a recommendation which could 
accelerate settlement and save faces.5 We all 
know that today, even with “adequate” rulings 
many cases are solved in a rather un-orthodox 
way, not to say through non-transparent, even 
dirty deals leaving third parties frustrated and 
the rules system jeopardised. The right to 
negotiate a way out at all times must be re-
established in order to respond to systemic 
criticism of the present state of affairs. I hope 
this can be addressed in another session of 
our meeting today. 
Five Suggestions 
OK, instead of wasting our time with 
accusations or “speed ruling” proposals let me 
make [five] suggestions which could accelerate 
the procedures and reduce the potential for 
“overreach”. It is high time to re-gain the 
reputation of what I sometimes jokingly call 
the “Miracle of Marrakesh”, and what I 
seriously think is the world’s fastest and 
cheapest intergovernmental dispute settlement 
system – including the ECJ which incidentally 
declined to rule on bananas and biotech. 
Change “days” into “WTO working days” – 
as suggested by Honduras and others. How 
many times have I tried to shift the heavy 
work away from the Secretariat in order to 
enjoy a Xmas break or other holiday with my 
family!? 
Ban the terms “jurisprudence” and “case law”. 
The latter is found 13’880 times on the WTO 
website, even though it does not appear in any 
WTO Agreement, let alone in the DSU. 
Besides, it reads differently in common law 
and in codified law systems; WTO Law 
belongs to neither. If we keep this in our 
minds, be they party, adjudicator or academic 
minds, our jobs will be easier – and faster. 
                                                          
5 Art. 19 DSU 




Regardless, everybody must make better 
efforts to avoid conflicting rulings in parallel 
cases: tear down the remaining firewalls 
between the three Secretariat Divisions and 
synchronise adjudicator work by letting 
adjudicators interact in substantially 
comparable cases! And, to the very least, ask 
adjudicators to describe how far they had to 
go in terms of rules interpretation in order to 
arrive at their recommendations to the DSB. 
Train all adjudicators before they start 
working. The focus of such trainings must be 
on those parts where adjudicator and 
Secretariat jobs differ. In short, whereas the 
Secretariat is the guardian of the rules, the 
adjudicators must find at each gateway the 
“easy” solutions for the respondent. This 
includes tackling the dilemma I already 
referred to: the grey zone between rule-
reading and rule-making. I understand that 
some attempts have been made in this 
respect. But in order to highlight the different 
roles of WTO staff and adjudicators, I posit 
that only a training extra muros is adequate. 
This is the only way to help especially junior 
and non-lawyer experts to sign off on draft 
reports without pondering the merits of 
alternative solutions more palatable to the 
respondent. 
Abolish or reduce the procedures which have 
come to tarnish the reputation of the DS and 
the WTO. This implies open hearings with 
full access to every person registered – except 
for the so-called “Confidential Business 
Information” (CBI) – and it should go all the 
way to Live Internet Streaming. Hearings are not 
a place for negotiations – nor should they turn 
into wailing walls. I know, and I have always 
respected the fact that some Members cannot 
accept public hearings – yet they have to in 
other international courts. If this is the price 
for appointing new AB members, perhaps it is 
worth the effort! 
Reduce the public panel hearings to one. Did 
you ever gain additional insights from the 
second hearing? I don’t think I learned much 
in the second hearings which could not have 
been obtained through the Q/A process, 
including with and between Third Parties 
which then will no longer need “enhanced” 
rights. 
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Mr Marco Tulio Molina Tejeda 
 
I tend to agree that perhaps prompt 
settlement and adequate settlement of 
disputes are non-issues, as we see how the 
system is working. The question implies how 
to balance two relative concepts indeed. If 
you ask, for instance, an exporter, what is a 
prompt settlement, you will receive a 
completely different response to that than you 
will receive from a Member or the 
practitioners. If you are an exporter of 
tomatoes and you have two containers at the 
border that cannot enter the export market, a 
prompt settlement is that that will allow this 
exporter to sell the tomatoes in that market. If 
you ask a Member, perhaps other 
considerations will come into play. And if you 
ask practitioners, deadlines are too short in 
this mechanism. Always are too short. So, the 
thing is, perhaps we can, in a way, look at this 
from a different perspective. Prompt 
settlement, in my humble opinion, is 
calibration of expectations, perceptions, and 
incentives.  
Expectations. You expect something out of 
this mechanism, and normally you have to 
consider what the alternatives to the use of 
the dispute settlement mechanism are. What if 
we don't have a WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism? And when you go through the 
alternatives, you will find that perhaps 
countermeasures are one of those alternatives. 
Going to domestic tribunals is another 
alternative. Or perhaps, if applicable, you have 
an FTA dispute settlement mechanism 
available. But what are the costs, the 
timeframes, the efficiency and efficacy of 
those alternatives is something that enters into 
the concept of expectations.  
Perceptions. It is taking too long? It could 
have been resolved more efficiently? This is 
the kind of question that we all ask ourselves, 
depending on what role we are playing. And 
of course, what kind of incentives the system 
is creating in this regard? For instance, if you 
have a system that is taking too long in the 
settlement of disputes, perhaps we are 
creating an incentive for Members to take 
inconsistent measures, because we know that 
before a prospective solution is given,  the 
Parties to the dispute have to wait three or 
four years of litigation before the DSB tells 
any Member to put the measure into 
conformity with the WTO Agreements. So, 
this is the kind of issues that may surround 
the concept of prompt settlement. 
Adequate settlement. The same goes to 
adequate settlement of disputes. If you ask the 
exporters, they don't care about systemic 
implications or the Vienna Convention. They 
only want to sell their products abroad. If you 
ask Members, on the other hand, you will 
receive different kinds of answers when it 
comes to an "adequate" settlement. Because, 
in each dispute we are not just discussing 
perhaps the measure itself; but we are 
discussing what are the systemic implications 
of the panels’ and Appellate Body findings 
and conclusions, what kind of expectations 
are we creating; we are perhaps defending 
domestic policies and safeguarding policy 
space. So, perhaps, it's not necessarily relevant 
to answer the questions about what prompt 
settlement is and what adequate settlement is. 
We may focus in a different way to deal with 
this issue. Instead of finding a balance 
between these two concepts, perhaps the 
question should be how we can make the 
system more efficient. And what we do in this 
organization, when we want to propose 
something? We normally go to a dictionary 




and check the definition; in this case, the 
definition of “efficiency”. Efficiency implies 
"being able to accomplish something with the 
least waste of time and effort". This is perhaps 
a better way not to have these fundamental 
and philosophical discussions about how the 
system should work. Maybe we may be better 
off if we can find ways in which we can waste 
less resources and make the system work 
properly, or better than it is working today. 
So, the idea is to find a new equilibrium in 
Members' expectations, perceptions, and 
incentives, and, as Mr Häberli did, I would 
like also to put for your consideration a 
couple of proposals or examples of how to 
make the system more efficient. 
One idea is to reinforce the disciplines of 
Article 5 of the DSU, and encourage their use. 
As a complaining party, if you ask me, why 
Guatemala, for instance, doesn't use Article 5 
mechanisms, it is because we are trying to get 
prompt settlement of the dispute. We don't 
want to take the risk of using Article 5, engage 
in good offices, conciliation and/or 
meditation, and if we fail in finding a mutually 
satisfactory solution, we would have just 
added the time needed for the use of those 
mechanisms to the time for consultations. So, 
one simple idea is to have the possibility to 
choose between going to a formal 
consultation, or using Article 5 mechanisms, 
before requesting the establishment of the 
panel. Informal consultations start earlier in 
the process, including bringing the issue to a 
committee, at least for a couple of meetings, 
then you continue trying to negotiate with the 
Member, and, then by the time you request 
consultations, you know that it is just a 
formality, because you are not going to get a 
different answer from that that you received 
during the informal process. So what if we 
have the possibility to choose mediation or 
conciliation instead of formal consultations? 
Perhaps we might solve more disputes, 
because sometimes, internally, to negotiate 
with the stakeholders, we need someone else 
to tell us that the measure is inconsistent, and 
perhaps it's better to reach an agreement with 
the other party.  
Then, another suggestion, but a little bit more 
sensitive perhaps, more difficult to sell in this 
Organization, is reducing incentives for non-
compliance. This goes more with the concept 
of adequate solution. If you see today, the 
system is designed to provide a prospective 
solution. And this prospective solution may 
create incentives for Members to take 
inconsistent measures for a while. Just, as a 
kind of safeguard, without a need to give any 
compensation or initiate any investigation.  
Retaliation is a luxury that only a few 
Members in this organization can afford. For 
instance, I think that the European Union 
would not take very seriously Guatemala, if 
Guatemala were to retaliate with 20 million 
dollars, for whatever dispute we had. So, the 
way the system is structured today, is that 
compensation is negotiated, is voluntary, and 
is very easy for the defendant Member to say 
“ok I cannot agree on compensation, so you 
do whatever you have to do. That is, if you 
want to retaliate against me, go ahead”. And 
then, retaliation most of the time, might be 
ineffective. So, it shifts the burden on the 
complaining party, and especially on those 
small developing countries that cannot afford 
retaliation.  
So, there are two ideas. What if, for example, 
we make compensation compulsory? Just not 
to allow the defendant to get away with this 
situation of: "I cannot agree on any 
compensation." So at least there is a 
reputational cost if the defendant Member 
says, "OK, I cannot give compensation, so you 
proceed with retaliation."  
The other option, which is a bit more serious 
and requires a change in the system, is to 
incorporate the concept of reparation as we 
know it in public international law. With a 
caveat, reparation could be triggered if, only 
if, compliance comes after the expiration of 
the RPT, for instance. So that it would create 
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an incentive to comply within the RPT, the 
reasonable period of time to comply, and, if 
not, then, there would be an obligation to 
repair following the rules of international law. 
Then the last. I have many other suggestions 
but I only have 10 minutes, so I am running 
out of time. The last couple of suggestions. 
There might be a need for panels and the 
Appellate Body to change their policy and the 
way they deal with disputes and they draft 
their reports. For instance, when it comes to 
the Appellate Body, and there are no facts to 
complete the legal analysis, I personally 
believe that we need only two sentences: “we 
don't have enough facts available to complete 
the legal analysis”; or, if you want to extend a 
little bit: “we don't have these precise facts to 
complete the legal analysis” and describe the 
missing facts. We don't need 30 pages, 40 
pages of explanations, what are the facts of 
the dispute and why it is not possible to 
complete the legal analysis.  I don't think that 
we need extensive explanations for something 
that, at the end, will result in not completing 
the legal analysis. 
The same goes when it comes to confirming a 
panel's findings or conclusions. If there is 
confirmation of these panel’s findings or 
conclusions, I don't think that it is necessary 
to explain why the Appellate Body is 
confirming the decision made by the panel. If 
there is a disagreement with a panel’s 
reasoning, but the conclusion is the same, 
perhaps it is easier to say, "while we disagree 
with several of the panel's interpretations or 
reasonings, we concur with the outcome of 
the panel", and that would be sufficient to 
resolve the dispute. That would not change, in 
my view, the way the parties would consider 
the Appellate Body Report. And this is 
important why? Because today, Members are 
focusing more on interpreting the panels’ and 
the Appellate Body's reports, rather than the 
Agreements themselves. And that is why I 
tend to agree with Christian that perhaps we 
need to ban this idea of jurisprudence from 
our vocabulary. The less it is being said, the 
better, because once we have a finding or 
conclusion by the Appellate Body, then it's 
very difficult to change that in the future and 
every case is different. We cannot foresee 
what's going to happen in the future when it 
comes to a decision that we are making for a 
particular dispute.  
 
 




Mr Alan Yanovich 
 
 
I'm going to follow up on some of the 
comments that Cherise made, with which I 
agree. But my solution is slightly different 
than hers, because I don't think that lawyers 
can control themselves, so as you'll see, my 
solution is for panels to control lawyers, 
especially complaining party lawyers, but I'll 
get to that in a bit. 
I found it curious that we keep shifting 
between prompt and satisfactory, and prompt 
and adequate. The programme said adequate, 
I found that interesting. Adequate seems to 
involve sort of more discretion. James you 
changed it to satisfactory. I know what you 
had in mind. But it's quite interesting, and my 
starting point is, the system does pretty well, 
and I think we have to recognize that. I think 
the system does pretty well in terms of 
promptness, and I think the system does 
pretty well in terms of balancing promptness 
and adequateness and promptness and 
satisfactoriness. I think that should be our 
starting point. 
The second starting point is that the crisis, or 
the problem we may face in December, goes 
beyond promptness, it really goes to the 
functioning of the system. I personally think 
that, if things are not resolved before 
December, the system may stop operating. It's 
not just that it's going to slow down, so I 
think that's a different problem, a much more 
serious problem, and one that I do hope gets 
resolved before then. I think we all hope that, 
and we all encourage Members to do their 
utmost to resolve that problem. Then, in 
terms of the current situation of the Appellate 
Body, I think it would be very difficult to 
accuse the Appellate Body of not being 
prompt, given what is happening right now. I 
think it's quite remarkable that the Appellate 
Body is functioning the way it is right now, 
and I think we need to recognize that. So my 
comments focus more on panels, and not 
because I think panels are not doing a good 
job, I think in general panels are, but I do that 
that the system can be a little bit uneven 
between complaining parties and responding 
parties. I have been responding counsel in 
several cases recently, and perhaps am more 
acutely aware of these disadvantages than 
others, but those are the ones that I would 
like to address in my brief comments today. 
It is surprising, in many ways there seems to 
be this understanding in the WTO, that 
settlement and prompt settlement means 
some kind of finding in favour of the 
complaining party. I don't think that should 
be the case. I think a situation where a panel 
rejects the arguments of the complaining 
party, and the complaining party does not get 
the remedy that it thought it deserved, is 
settlement. And if it's done quickly, it would 
be a prompt settlement. And if it's done 
according to the rules, it would be a 
satisfactory settlement, and sometimes I think 
we need to be more aware of this: that 
settlement can mean that the complaining 
party's case is rejected in its totality, for 
instance. 
Then, it's surprising, for instance, when you 
read the DSU, you look at the appendix, and 
the timetable in the model working 
procedures. And it gives the respondent half 
the time that it gives the complaining party. I 
think it talks about the complaining party has 
three to six weeks to do its first written 
submission, the responding party gets two to 
three weeks. Why? What's the logic of that? If 
anything, the complaining party has all of the 
time before the request for consultations and 
all of the time before the request for 
establishment, and these days will prepare its 
case maybe a year before it initiates, and then 
suddenly the responding party is meant to 
have two to three weeks? That no longer 
makes sense. And I think panels, generally, 
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have been good in recognizing this, and 
panels generally have started to give 
respondent parties more time, but it is still a 
struggle in the first organizational meeting to 
get more time for the responding party. It 
should be more obvious that the differences 
are significant, especially when complaining 
parties start building their case much, much 
before the panel is even requested. Then, the 
other one that strikes me is that panels allow 
the complaining party to make its prima facie 
case up to the first panel meeting. Why is 
that? Shouldn't the complaining party be 
required to make its prima facie case in its 
first written submission? Why does the 
complaining party get a second bite at the 
apple in the first panel meeting? So, the 
complaining party makes its first written 
submission, puts up its evidence, the 
respondent replies and says that this is 
insufficient, then the complaining party gets 
another chance to fill in the gaps and provide 
more evidence to fill in any gaps in its initial 
case. Why should it be getting that chance? If 
it didn't make a prima facie case in the first 
written submission, its case should be 
rejected. That should have been its 
opportunity. You might even say it creates 
incentives for a complaining party to withhold 
some of its evidence and to present it only at 
the first panel meeting. Why? Because the 
other side gets no time at all to respond. It has 
to respond on the spot. You might say, well, 
the respondent party gets a chance to reply in 
the written questions, but as Mr Häberli just 
said, an experienced panellist, the panellists 
have formed their first impressions in that 
first panel meeting, and the respondent party 
is at a huge disadvantage when the 
complaining party comes in with new 
evidence, new facts perhaps, a new expert 
report, that the responding party has not even 
had a chance to review. So, why? Why is it 
that they get that shot? Why not force the 
complaining party to provide all of its 
evidence from the very beginning, and then 
focus the first panel meeting on all of the 
evidence that has been submitted in its 
entirety? 
I come to the concept of prompt settlement. I 
recognize that the concept of prompt 
settlement is in the DSU, and it is one of the 
objectives of the DSU, that the drafters had in 
mind. But if you look at how it's been used, 
more frequently it has been used to the 
advantage of complaining parties. It's been 
used to broaden the understanding of the 
measures that may be challenged. It has been 
used to broaden the measures that may be 
challenged under Article 21.5. It has been 
used to justify the concept of completing the 
analysis, and that is to the benefit of 
complaining parties. So, we have to be careful 
about this concept of prompt settlement. In 
the end, I would just say, look, I think the 
system does remarkably well. I think some 
panellists are more aware of this issue than 
others. The system, as it is, believe it or not, , 
I think, gives more advantages to the 
complaining party, and this has to be 
considered. The concept of prompt 
settlement cannot be pushed too far. Prompt 
settlement cannot undermine the rights of the 
respondent party. And prompt settlement 
should mean that if a complaining party does 
not make its prima facie case in its first 
written submission, that should be the end of 
the case. That would be just as prompt. But 
for some reason, whenever a complaining 
party doesn't do it in its first written 
submission, the concept of prompt settlement 
is used to allow the complaining party to 
provide more information. Why? Because the 
notion is, if we don't do it now, then we'll 
bring another case. So be it! Bring another 
case! But the concept of prompt settlement 
should not be used to the disadvantage of the 
respondent party in that case. If the 
complaining party did not provide the 
evidence at the time, then that should be the 
end of the case, and if it has to start on 
another case, so be it. But the initial case 
would have been promptly settled by the 
rejection of the claims. 
And then, finally, I do think it's panels and 
panellists that must take control. There is no 
control on the part of the lawyers. And 
lawyers, unless panels exercise more control, 




will not have incentives to exercise more 
control. I'll give you an example: you have a 
big case, and then suddenly, because it's a big 
case with lots of claims on appeal, they get 
two hearings, two Appellate Body hearings. 
Why should that be? Why should a lawyer that 
exceeded him or herself in making a very, very 
long notice of appeal, and a very, very long 
appellant's submission, be rewarded with two 
hearings, when someone who keeps his or  
submission short, only gets one hearing. That 
shouldn’t be the case, but that's actually what 
happens today, so the incentive is to raise 
more and more claims, and have longer and 
longer submissions. So I think it's panels and 
the Appellate Body that need to be exercising 
this control, and that would be my suggestion. 
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Comments following Session 2 
 
Mr Frieder Roessler  
 
I would like to make a general remark about 
delays in dispute settlement proceedings. 
Justice delayed is justice denied and one 
would therefore expect the complainant to 
systematically attempt to shorten the 
proceedings as much as possible. But in my 
experience, that is not always the case. Most 
complaints concern a non-tariff measure 
protecting a particular domestic industry and 
are won. As the dispute settlement 
proceedings advance, it usually becomes more 
and more obvious to that industry that the 
measure will have to be withdrawn. This gives 
the industry an incentive to adapt, for instance 
by ceasing to replace machines or to hire new 
staff. Ideally, when the responding 
government has to remove the measures, the 
industry has already adjusted to the new 
situation. A shorter proceeding is likely to 
increase the industry’s adjustment cost, which 
in turn might prompt the responding 
government to replace the measure found to 
be inconsistent with WTO law with a 
protectionist measure permitted under WTO 
law, such as a safeguard measure or a higher 
tariff. In that case, nothing would be gained 
for the export industry whose interests the 
complainant sought to defend. Given these 
alternatives of the respondent, it may in 
certain cases be rational for the complainant 
to treat the respondent softly and give its 
industry time to adjust. To be clear: I am not 
in favour of longer dispute settlement 
proceedings. I am simply pointing out that the 
issue of delays and the options of the 
respondent at the end of the proceedings are 
sometimes linked. 
Alan, you complained about the timetable for 
panel proceedings set out in Appendix 3 of 
the DSU. You might be interested to know 
where this timetable comes from and why the 
period of time accorded to the respondent to 
prepare its first submission is so short.   
When I joined the legal office of the GATT 
Secretariat in 1982, I looked at the working 
procedures of all past panels and I found that 
each division in the GATT had proposed to 
panels a different procedure with a different 
timetable. It seemed strange to me that the 
treatment of the disputant parties by panels 
varied with the operational division servicing 
the panel. So, I drafted a proposal for uniform 
working procedures with a uniform timetable, 
allocating to each step in the proceedings the 
time that past panels had on average allocated 
to that step. These procedures became the 
standard procedures used by all panels and 
these subsequently found their way into the 
DSU.  
Why did the panels give so little time to the 
respondent to prepare its first submission? In 
the 1960’s and 1970’s the dispute settlement 
procedures were completely voluntary. As a 
consequence, a case could not reach the panel 
stage until both parties to the dispute had 
agreed to submit their differences to a panel. 
Under these circumstances panels could 
realistically assume that the respondent knew 
already before the proceeding which issues 
and arguments the  complainant was going to 
raise in its first submission and that the 
respondent therefore needed only little time 
to react to that submission. Based on this 
assumption some panels even required both 
parties to the dispute to provide their first 
submissions on the same date.  
All this explains but does not justify the short 
time available to the respondent to prepare its 
first submission. I agree with Alan that the 
limited time accorded to respondents no 
longer makes any sense given the complexity 
of the disputes before WTO panels and the 
practice of WTO Members not to reveal all 
their legal arguments during consultations. 
 
Mr James Flett 
I hope I'm allowed to react to one of the 
comments that was made by another panellist. 




And so the point that I would like to react to 
is this concept of overreach, which is perhaps 
too much discussed, but nevertheless some 
statements were made about it. I'd just like to 
offer a couple of thoughts about this based on 
many, many years of practice, of many cases 
looking at many interpretive issues. As Niall 
reminded us in the previous panel, Article 3.2 
of the DSU does direct us towards the 
customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law, which most people accept 
are codified, at least at part, in the Vienna 
Convention, Article 31, well Articles 31 to 33, 
but especially Article 31. We know what they 
are. And it is a cipher, and it's not a trivial 
thing. And we all know what's in there, the 
various parameters of good faith, intangible, 
but important, and indispensable. Have you 
ever smoked dope? No? Oh here is a picture 
of you smoking dope. I didn't inhale. That's 
bad faith, right? We all know what good faith 
is and bad faith is when we see it. Good faith 
is important. Ordinary meaning, context, 
object, and purpose. We can also add in the 
more developed rules on context that you will 
be familiar with. We can also add in the 
supplementary means of interpretation, so the 
so-called negotiating history and the 
circumstances of conclusion, and we can add 
in the three different language versions, 
Article 33. It's actually quite an extensive list.  
Now, if somebody were to ask me, how many 
cases have you seen where there are 
competing interpretations or things that are 
advanced as so-called interpretations, and 
each one of those interpretations ticks all of 
those boxes. How many? I'm struggling to 
think of one. When we sit down in my office, 
and the team where I work, and we look at 
these issues, and we work systematically 
through that cipher in order to figure out 
what we think our position as a third party, 
for example, is going to be, it is almost always 
the case that one of the litigants has a glaring 
hole on one of these criteria. There is 
something seriously wrong with their position, 
while the other litigant does a plausible job at 
ticking all the boxes. So whilst the process of 
interpretation and applying that cipher to 
these rules, which are ambiguous and are 
difficult, is not completely objective, to 
pretend that it is extraordinarily subjective is, I 
think, simply not the case. We have been 
given instructions. The earlier panel talked 
about instructions. The judges have been 
given instructions. They are in the Vienna 
Convention. They apply those instructions. 
They exercise the responsibility they have to 
do that. That's not just the mandate that 
they've been given, but the obligation. We 
cannot afterwards shoot the messenger with 
some cheap language about overreach. It's 
unacceptable. That is the reality of practice. 
The Vienna Convention is extremely good at 
identifying what is the most plausible, the best 
interpretation, in my experience.  
And the second thing I want to say is, in an 
awful lot of disputes, there is no dispute 
between the two WTO Members. I can sit 
and have a coffee at the coffee break, during 
the appeal hearing, talk to a lawyer from the 
other side whom I know well and whom I 
trust, and we can discuss what the outcome is 
going to be, because we both know in our 
hearts who is wrong and who is right. The real 
story is that there is a dispute inside one WTO 
Member, usually the defendant, that has 
gotten stuck. And that is why the dispute 
comes to the WTO. And I think Niall is 
absolutely right when he says that it's a 
service. WTO Dispute Settlement is actually 
most often a service for the defendant, most 
of the time. It's just like going to the dentist. 
Right? It's maybe a little bit unpleasant, but if 
you don't do it on a frequent basis, eventually 
your teeth fall out. So, I think this is 
something to really understand about WTO 
Dispute Settlement, the reality of it. It's not 
really contentious often between the Members 
themselves. It's a service which is provided to 
resolve a difficult point that has arisen within 
one WTO Member. There are many, many 
cases like that.  
My third point on judicial overreach, actually I 
don't think it's very difficult, really, 
conceptually, is to trace the line between what 
it is acceptable for the judge to do, and what it 
is not acceptable for the judge to do.  Again, 
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the Vienna Convention tells us, because the 
Vienna Convention uses the phrase, "the 
terms of the treaty". Please don't use the word 
text, it's not there, except in the section on 
context. Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention talks about the terms of the 
treaty, and the terms of the treaty are the 
terms of the treaty that frame, directly, the 
obligation or the right in question. The shall, 
or the may, and the connective words. That's 
it. That is the object of the interpretive 
process. Those are the words that need to be 
clarified and applied. Context is everything 
else. And I think, in my view, a fair statement 
to make, is that what the judge should not be 
doing is interpreting context. Context is not 
the object of the interpretive exercise. It's an 
analytical tool which is there in order to clarify 
the terms of the treaty, which again I insist are 
those which are directly connected to the 
obligation: the shall, or the right: the may. 
And as long as judges are only doing that, and 
applying the law as clarified to the facts, in my 
view they are not engaging in something 
called judicial overreach, which is just the 
language used by a bad loser They are simply 
executing the responsibility that the entire 
Membership has placed upon them. And it's 
improper and unhelpful to suggest otherwise. 
 
Dr. Christian Häberli 
 
Five quick points. I understand and share the 
idea that there are many good reasons to go 
slow in a proceeding. Some are less good also, 
right, Frieder? Second comment, the 
complainants’ interests are not identical, 
sometimes not at all identical, with the 
exporters’ interests, and that, then, makes 
government positions sometimes different 
from what the tomato exporter would really 
like to see. This is something we have to leave 
to parties to decide how they defend their 
case. Third remark, on Biotech, I will certainly 
not comment on this ruling, but I can say I'm 
not proud that we had to issue 1,063 just for 
the rulings. But, I do submit that for 
implementation, we saw a lot of cooperation 
and dialogue between the three complainants 
and the EU. Fourth remark, in the COOL 
dispute, because I'm a Swiss delegate, and in 
Switzerland we have mandatory labelling for 
certain methods of production, I had the 
solution really in my sleeve. I was not allowed 
to make a recommendation to the parties, 
without being asked by the Parties, but I was 
able to say in a well-hidden footnote that 
there were solutions fulfilling the consumer 
information purpose of the measure. In fact, 
intra-panel difficulties disallowed me from 
being more explicit there. Finally, for James, 
of course there are competing interpretations, 
and I have to disagree that good faith is 
always evident. Your faith is good by your 
definition, and the other guy’s faith is bad. 
The same goes for protectionism. Every 
complainant accuses the other of being a 
protectionist and there is nowhere in the 
whole WTO bible where that word is defined, 
just as is the case with “undue delay”. It then 
is for the adjudicator to come up with what is 
a non-tariff measure and what is a non-tariff 
barrier, very simply, and to play the role of a 
dentist - there I agree with you. We have to 
sometimes come out and say, look, this is a 
barrier, and this just a measure. This is the 
legitimate policy space, which everybody 
needs, and this is too much because you 
walked on somebody else's foot. So, these are 
very simple but not always easy ways forward 
for adjudicators. Vienna can be of help, but 
let's not go into that here. 
 
Mr Alan Yanovich 
Just 3 points in reaction. Thank you, Frieder, 
for the clarification on the timetable. I hope 
that information becomes more widely 
known, so panels understand that they 
shouldn't put too much faith in that timetable, 
otherwise the DSU is as close to perfect as 
you can get. That's my only complaint. I agree 
with Professor Howse that the standard 
review is a way to sort of limit what a 
complainant can do, and provide for more 
prompt settlement, and I think Continued 
Suspension is an exemplary case, 
unfortunately it has become the exception. 
The Appellate Body is not applying 




Continued Suspension when reviewing claims 
under the other provisions of the SPS 
Agreement, and what's happening is, 
complaining parties are avoiding Article 5.1 
and are going to other provisions in order to 
avoid that stricter standard of review. That 
shouldn't happen and should be corrected. 
And, finally, to the point that James made, I 
agree that many times there is a lot of debate 
within the responding Member, but I think it's 
for the responding Member to resolve that 
debate, not for a panel. So if there are 
competing interests, if there is internal debate 
about the level or risk or the level of 
protection, it is for the respondent Member to 
resolve tht debate, and not for the panel. So 
the existence of that debate, to me, doesn't 
suggest that the panel should side with the 
complaining party. 
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Ambassador J.S. Deepak 
 
 
So, before I invite the panellists to make their 
interventions, let me just share a few thoughts 
with you. I don't think I would be 
exaggerating if  I say that the WTO's dispute 
settlement system is going through its most 
difficult and turbulent phase since its 
inception. Questions are being raised on its 
very purpose of  its existence, the crown jewel 
of  the multilateral trading system appears to 
have lost its sheen. Albert Einstein once said 
that in the middle of  every difficulty lies 
opportunity. These challenging circumstances 
which we see the dispute settlement system 
facing also present us with an opportunity to 
inspect and reassess the system and, if  
possible, even improve it. Therefore, the 
discussions today are most timely. 
 
As envisaged in the DSU Article 3.2, the 
dispute settlement system is a central element 
in providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system. Hence I'm 
intrigued by the team of  the panel discussion 
today which states how to ensure that WTO 
dispute settlement contributes to the security 
and predictability of  the multilateral trading 
system. Perhaps hinting that the dispute 
settlement system might have failed to obtain 
this objective, at least partially in the past, and 
hence perhaps, going forward, there is a need 
to ensure that it fulfils the vison envisaged in 
Article 3.2. While we wait intently to listen to 
the panellists here who are all veterans in the 
field of  international trade law, I would like 
briefly to highlight a couple of  issues to 
trigger the discussions. 
 
First is the issue of  precedents. Several 
scholars have long argued that the consistent 
interpretation of  the covered agreements is a 
key route for obtaining security as well as 
predictability. To paraphrase David 
Unterhalter, a former AB Member, there is a 
deeply entrenched recognition that decisions 
of  the past carry weight and this is to quote "a 
legacy of  authority by reason". This legacy is 
now under very strong challenge. How can 
the dispute settlement system address this 
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without undermining its core objectives of  
ensuring security and predictability? What is 
the correct path ahead on this issue? 
 
The second point which I would like to allude 
to is the issue of  rights versus obligations. 
There have been instances in the past when 
panels and the Appellate Body have adopted a 
strict interpretation of  what constitutes a 
conflict between two WTO agreements. This 
strict interpretational approach is especially 
evident when the two provisions under the 
consideration for the purposes of  
determining a conflict relate to a permission 
to take an action, or a right, vis-à-vis a 
prohibition from taking an action, that is an 
obligation. The favoured approach of  WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body seems to have 
been to rule such provisions as not being in 
conflict, since it is possible to comply with the 
obligation by not exercising the related right. 
Giving primacy to the provisions imposing an 
obligation or of  those conferring a right may 
skew this balance in favour of  obligation. 
Does this not make the system less secure and 
less predictable?  
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Mr Philippe De Baere 
 
 
Professor Hillman is one of  the leading 
experts on the WTO and the Appellate Body 
in the room; I will, however, have to disagree 
with her on a certain number of  issues. 
Looking at the text of  Article 3.2 of  the DSU, 
it is correct that the dispute settlement system 
of  the WTO is described as a central element 
in providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system. But, as Professor 
Hillman pointed out in her intervention, in 
order to do so, the dispute settlement system 
is called upon to clarify the existing provisions 
of  WTO agreements without affecting the 
balance between the rights and obligations of  
WTO Members. This is obviously a very 
difficult task to perform.  
 
As a litigator, you tend to fully agree with the 
“correct” interpretation by the court in the 
cases you win. Conversely, when you lose a 
case, you are likely to consider that the 
balance of  rights and obligations established 
by the agreement has been upset and that the 
interpretation adopted by the adjudicator is 
unacceptable. We are now confronted with a 
crisis, mainly because one of  the most 
important Members of  the WTO, namely the 
United States, considers that the balance of  
rights and obligations in the WTO dispute 
settlement has been upset and that therefore 
the system can no longer perform its task in 
providing security and predictability. The US 
position, in my view, is merely an expression 
of  the inherent tension expressed in Article 
3.2 of  the DSU, between the security and 
predictability, on the one hand, and the 
requirement, on the other, that the dispute 
settlement system does not add to or diminish 
the rights of  the Members. The United States 
has raised a number of  concrete examples 
where it considers that the dispute settlement 
system has upset this balance. I will not repeat 
them in detail but I will try to outline some 
possible solutions. 
 
Inspired by Professor Hillman, I have tried to 
group possible solutions to restore the 
balance in three categories. Professor Hillman 
entitled them, "the good", "the bad", and "the 
ugly". I have divided them into "the easy", 
"the difficult", and "the extreme". I did add a 
fourth category, which copying on professor 
Hillman’s movie theme, I would like to call the 
“Brutti, sporchi e cattivi”. 
 
What are the easy solutions? The easy ones, in 
my view, relate to the operation of  the 
Appellate Body, namely the 90-day time-limit, 
the rules for outgoing Appellate Body 
members staying beyond their term, the 
treatment of  obiter dicta, the meaning of  
municipal law. There has been a proposal by a 
number of  WTO Members, including the 
European Union, in a communication dated 
26 November 2018, which addresses these 
issues by proposing to amend Article 17 of  
the DSU. I personally believe that this 
proposal would be adequate to address the 
concerns of  the United States. We also know, 
however, that the United States is very 
unlikely to accept this proposal. In the US 
view, no amendments of  the DSU are 
necessary. Instead, the United States wants 
everyone to play by the rules, as interpreted by 
the United States, that were agreed already in 
1994. This US obstruction, I believe, could be 
partially overcome by amending the Appellate 
Body's Working Procedures or by the 
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adoption of  certain authoritative 
interpretations on the basis of  Article IX:2 of  
the WTO Agreement. The advantage of  this 
solution is that authoritative interpretations 
can be adopted by a three-fourths majority, 
pursuant to the rules agreed in 1994, and no 
amendment of  the text of  the agreements 
would be necessary. 
 
The “difficult” solutions might be necessary 
to address the objections raised by the US as 
regards the issue of  the so-called "judicial 
overreach" and the issue of  precedent. In my 
view, the problem here lies not with the 
dispute settlement system but with the 
paralysis of  the legislative (negotiating) 
function of  the WTO. The Appellate Body is 
left on its own due to the failure of  WTO 
Members to exercise their political and 
legislative role. Members could, if  they wished 
so, correct reports which they considered as 
unacceptable. Members could also adopt new 
rules that would better fit the current trading 
environment. Now, in the absence of  this 
role, of  this other leg of  the WTO, the 
Appellate Body is in fact called upon to clarify 
legal provisions which are, by their nature, and 
sometimes by the intent of  the drafters, 
ambiguous. This difficulty is obviously 
amplified by the fact that the Appellate Body 
is operating in a world that is very different 
from the one the drafters had in mind. 
 
One of  the approaches proposed is that, in 
cases where the WTO Agreements are 
allegedly intentionally ambiguous or where 
otherwise different permissible interpretations 
are possible, the Appellate Body would refrain 
from overturning a panel report where that 
panel report followed one of  these 
interpretations. In my view, this solution 
proposed would just raise a number of  new 
problems. Foremost, isn't it always the 
function of  the adjudicator to make choices 
between different possible interpretations? 
Where would the Appellate Body have to 
draw the line between clarification and judicial 
overreach, between the multiple meanings 
inherent in any legal text and so-called 
“intentional, constructive" ambiguity? By 
forcing it on the Appellate Body to make 
these choices, we risk replacing one problem 
with another. We would basically be kicking 
the can down the road. Indeed, the decision 
that, after applying the interpretative rules of  
the Vienna Convention, multiple 
interpretations are permissible is likely to be 
equally controversial. Solving instances of  
constructive ambiguity, intentional omissions 
or adapting the rules to the new trading 
environment is a role which should be played 
by WTO Members, not the Appellate Body. 
And the question we are faced with today is: 
What can we do, when WTO Members do 
not play this role and somehow refrain from 
exercising the legislative function? 
 
As an EU lawyer, I have seen how the 
European Court of  Justice (ECJ) has played a 
role in actually instigating the EU institutions 
to adopt certain rules. In a sense, there was a 
comparable situation in the EC before the 
creation of  the single market in 1992. EC 
Member States were entitled to derogate from 
the prohibition in Article 28 of  the EC Treaty 
(now Article 34 TFEU), which prohibited 
quantitative restrictions on measures having 
equivalent effect between Member States, 
unless they were somehow justified by 
legitimate policy objectives, which were listed 
in Article 30 (now Article 36 TFEU). Since 
the famous Cassis de Dijon judgment, the ECJ 
consistently ruled that in the absence of  
common EC rules on approximation or 
harmonization, each Member State was free 
to set its own desired level of  protection. This 
led to a fragmentation of  the EC market and 
was clearly seen as a less than perfect 
outcome. Hence, the ECJ made it clear 
through its judgements that in those areas 
where there was insufficient harmonization, 
legislative action was required. These 
judgements were therefore seen as a call for 
action addressed to the EC institutions in 
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order to agree on common rules. As we know, 
this eventually led to the adoption of  the 
single market programme in 1992. In other 
words, following these ECJ judgments, the 
legislators stepped in to correct what was 
perceived as an undesirable outcome due to 
the lack of  common rules.  
 
In the same way, the Appellate Body should 
have the possibility to call upon WTO 
Members to adopt new rules, or, more likely, 
to adopt authoritative interpretations of  the 
existing rules, where it feels that such action is 
necessary. Conversely, WTO Members should 
be able to correct certain rulings and 
interpretations of  the Appellate Body by 
means of  authoritative interpretations, which 
would be adopted by a three-fourths special 
majority pursuant to Article IX:2 of  the WTO 
Agreement. To achieve this, and as suggested 
by the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, a system of  legislative remand 
could be developed, whereby the Appellate 
Body could include in its report a request or a 
recommendation to WTO Members for an 
authoritative interpretation of  certain 
provisions. Under this hypothesis, the 
Appellate Body would still issue its report and 
the Dispute Settlement Body would still adopt 
it under the existing negative consensus rule, 
however, the Membership would be expressly 
called upon to take corrective action in case it 
disagrees with the interpretation of  the 
Appellate Body. The Appellate Body could 
use legislative remand if  a panel (or several 
panels) depart from a precedent based on 
cogent reasons. Likewise, legislative remand 
could be called for by mutual agreement of  
the parties to the dispute or if  the Appellate 
Body report contains any dissenting opinions. 
In conclusion, the ultimate solution must 
reinforce the corrective role of  the WTO 
Membership, instead of  weakening the 
dispute settlement system. 
 
Let me come to the “extreme” solution, 
which is based on a perception or fear that the 
United States might have a more fundamental 
problem with the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism - namely, with its compulsory 
jurisdiction. In other words, the US objections 
could be merely a pretext to limit or cripple 
the jurisdiction of  the Appellate Body. 
Indeed, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body is 
the only remaining international “tribunal” 
that has compulsory jurisdiction over the 
United States.  
 
There is a precedent of  the US opposition to 
compulsory jurisdiction of  other international 
courts. For instance, in 1946, the United 
States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of  
the International Court of  Justice (ICJ). In 
1986, the United States withdrew from the 
compulsory jurisdiction of  the International 
Court of  Justice, however, it continued to 
appear before the ICJ in some cases based on 
ad hoc jurisdiction. In case we were to apply 
the ICJ precedent to the current crisis of  the 
WTO, a solution could be to amend the DSU 
in order to allow the United States to 
withdraw from the compulsory jurisdiction of  
the WTO, either completely or partially, and 
to replace it by an ad hoc jurisdiction. Under 
this model, a party to a particular dispute with 
the United States would need to agree on the 
WTO jurisdiction before that dispute is 
brought to the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. This solution would obviously be 
conditioned on the United States’ approval of  
the appointment of  new Appellate Body 
members and some of  the changes outlined 
above.  The withdrawal would be reversible 
and the United States at a later stage could 
still reaccept the compulsory WTO 
jurisdiction. This could form part of  
negotiations between the Members.  
 
A withdrawal from the compulsory WTO 
jurisdiction seems quite radical, and that is 
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also the reason why I categorize it under the 
"extreme" solutions. However, the advantage 
of  this solution is that the other WTO 
Members could maintain and reinforce the 
Appellate Body. The two main disadvantages 
of  this solution are obvious. First, as the 
League of  Nations example shows, the 
absence of  the world's largest economy from 
the system would seriously weaken its overall 
strength. However, the same result could be 
anticipated if  WTO Members were to opt for 
an arbitration mechanism under Article 25 of  
the DSU, as was suggested by some 
commentators. The second disadvantage is 
that it would no longer be possible, unless the 
United States agrees, to bring cases against it. 
However, if  the Appellate Body has 
insufficient members at the end of  2019, the 
situation will be even worse. Yet another 
important consideration in favour of  this 
extreme solution is that the United States 
increasingly tries to rely on Article XXI of  the 
GATT 1994 as a way to escape WTO 
jurisdiction. In these circumstances, the 
situation would not be so much worse under a 
solution that would introduce (a temporary) 
ad hoc WTO jurisdiction, and allow the United 
States to opt in on an ad hoc basis. 
 
Finally, what are the “Brutti, sporchi e cattivi”, 
the “ugly, dirty and bad” solutions? In my 
view, that would be to exclude only certain 
agreements from the WTO jurisdiction, for 
instance, the trade defence instruments. An 
important consideration is that trade defence 
instruments constitute the overwhelming 
majority of  disputes, and the role of  a dispute 
settlement mechanism would be significantly 
diminished. Indeed, more than 60-70 per cent 
of  all WTO cases are about trade defence 
rules. Obviously, there would also be practical 
difficulties, as many disputes relate to several 
covered agreements, including but not limited 
to those dealing with trade defence matters.  
 
A second dangerous solution would be to 
create a separate tribunal or dispute settlement 
mechanism for trade defence instruments, this 
seems to be a solution which is inspired by the 
separate dispute settlement mechanisms 
included in the NAFTA agreements. We all 
know what happened in NAFTA with 
Chapter 20 dispute settlement which became 
paralyzed due to the United States blocking 
panel selection. Why would not the same 
impasse arise if  a separate dispute settlement 
mechanism were created for trade defence 
instruments without the introduction of  a 
mechanism preventing Members from 
blocking appointments? Moreover, as already 
stated, many disputes crosscut several covered 
agreements and are not necessarily limited to 
those dealing with trade defence matters 
 
Another “dangerous” solution would be to 
move away from the negative consensus rule 
and return to some kind of  GATT panel 
system. This would also mean a return to all 
the challenges that existed in the GATT-era 
and that led WTO Members to accept the 
compulsory WTO jurisdiction in 1994. 
Among others, we would clearly have a lack 
of  independence of  the panelists and panel 
decisions would be more likely colored by the 
political and economic weight of  the parties.  
 
To conclude, I see four categories of  
solutions to the WTO dispute settlement 
crisis:  the “easy”, the “difficult” and the 
“extreme” solutions, and a number of  
“dangerous” or “ugly” solutions, which, in my 
view, should be avoided. Ideally, whatever 
solution is chosen, the outcome should be 
that  the existing dispute settlement system is 
maintained or even strengthened by restoring 
the dialogue between the WTO’s legislative 
and judicial functions.  
 
 
40 |   E N S U R I N G  T H A T  D I S P U T E  S E T T L E M E N T  C O N T R I B U T E S  T O  T H E  
S E C U R I T Y  A N D  P R E D I C T A B I L I T Y  O F  T H E  M U L T I L A T E R A L  T R A D I N G  
S Y S T E M  
  
Professor Jennifer Hillman 
 
 
 I  want to thank Professor Petersmann for 
commenting on the proposals I have 
suggested—loosely titled “The Good, The 
Bad and The Ugly,” with the upfront caveat 
that beauty is in the eye of  the beholder.  
Professor Petersmann’s idea of  moving to a 
voting system is something that I have been 
attempting to outline as well. I confess that I 
put it into the category not of  "good", "bad", 
but in the category of  "ugly", because I fear 
that there are a number of  risks  that would 
come out of  the notion of  moving to a vote. 
But having said that, given that no-one can 
throw rotten tomatoes at me all the way from 
Geneva, I am going to take the risk of  being 
somewhat provocative, as I very much 
applaud the convening of  this conference 
with its title  "What Kind of  Dispute 
Settlement for the WTO?". But I fear that the 
underlying session titles read as though all that 
needs to change is to do a better job of  
communicating the virtues of  the current 
system as it is with perhaps a few tweaks here 
and there, while outside, and particularly not 
far from where I am sitting in Washington 
DC, the view is quite different, and it tells me 
that we are at a very dire point in which the 
most likely scenario is that as of  December 11 
of  this year, we will no longer have a 
functioning Appellate Body.  And with the 
demise of  the Appellate Body will come all of  
the negative legal implications that Professor 
Petersmann has just outlined. 
 
I fear that focusing on stability and 
predictability, or balancing promptness vs 
adequate settlement may be a bit of  
rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, so 
with all due respect to this session, I want to 
suggest that should at least consider the 
possibility that there has been too much 
predictability and stability in the system, and 
that by highlighting the notion of  stability and 
predictability, we may be diminishing the 
system's ability to preserve the rights and 
obligations of  the Members.  We may need 
much bolder action if  we are to save the 
Appellate Body and with it the binding 
dispute settlement system. 
 
As Ambassador Deepak made very clear in 
his opening remarks, the DSU asserts upfront  
that the dispute settlement system as a whole 
is a central element in providing stability and 
predictability to the multilateral trading 
system, but Article 3.2 goes on, very clearly, to 
set out two principle roles for the dispute 
settlement system: first, to preserve the rights 
and obligations of  the members, and secondly 
to clarify existing provisions of  the WTO 
Agreements. It's not clear to me whether 
we've gotten the balance between those things 
exactly right. For me, when I step back and 
think about what the risks were at the very 
beginning to set up a binding dispute 
settlement system, it was clear that such a 
system could have a number of  downsides.  
 
First, there was a risk that the system could 
act as a break on change and on the 
development of  new rules. If  a Member 
believes that it is advantaged by the rules as 
they now stand compared to a new set of  
rules that might impose greater disciplines on 
its own behaviour, that Member has very little 
incentive to agree to new rules. And if  the old 
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rules can be strictly enforced to one Member’s 
advantage, there is even less incentive to agree 
to a new set of  rules. And I think you see a 
corollary of  this in the statement that 
Ambassador Lighthizer made at Ministerial 
Conference (MC11) in Argentina last 
December, in which he stated: “Too often 
members seem to believe they can gain 
concessions through lawsuits that they could 
never get at the negotiating table.”  
 
The second risk that has been there from the 
beginning is that the judicialization of  the 
dispute settlement process may complicate 
trade negotiations by limiting the ability of  
negotiators to rely on deliberative ambiguity 
to resolve their negotiating differences. If  
every agreement has to dot every "i" and cross 
every "t", in order to make sure that it can be 
applied in a strictly adjudicatory system, the 
risk arises that you  are you making it too hard 
to reach new agreements that can meet such 
an exacting drafting standard requiring 
agreement on detailed texts.  
 
And third there was always a risk that, to the 
extent that the dispute settlement system is 
seen as overly-limiting of  countries' ability to 
take discreet WTO legal measures to address 
either political opposition or to address 
particular economic stress, and here I would 
say particularly through the use of  trade-
remedies (anti-dumping, countervailing duties, 
or safeguards), the system can harm the 
overall support for the WTO and the rules-
based system. And I fear that the very strong 
emphasis on stability and predictability may 
have allowed some or all of  those down-sides 
to come to fruition to at least some degree.  
 
So, for me, it is worth questioning at this 
point of  crisis whether there has been such a 
strong emphasis on stability and predictability 
that there are too few opportunities for 
course correction within the dispute 
settlement system itself. Whether, within, or 
across disputes, over a given provision of  
WTO text, or across the system as a whole, 
we need to ask ourselves: Do we have enough 
room for the decisions of  the Appellate Body 
to be in ways re-shaped or re-examined or 
moved in any way?  Has the notion of  
stability and predictability become so strongly 
enshrined that there is not sufficient room to 
make changes where they might be needed 
and might make an important contribution to 
the balance between protecting the rights and 
obligations of  Members with the need for 
stability.  
 
It is very clear that the decisions of  the 
Appellate Body have become virtually 
enshrined as the applicable law of  the WTO. 
Just consider  how many hours are spent 
during hearings of  the Appellate Body 
debating and interpreting the text, not of  the 
WTO Agreements themselves, but of  prior 
Appellate Body reports, where much 
emphasis is placed on understanding exactly 
what the Appellate Body has said, raising 
Appellate Reports up close to equal footing 
with the treaty text itself. With so much time 
and effort focused on the text of  prior 
decisions, there appears to be little time or 
space to reconsider the text and its 
implications from decisions of  the past. And 
the standard for what constitutes cogent 
reasons to depart  from past decisions may 
need to be examined at least in the context of  
this discussion. Has that bar been set in the 
right place or are we making it too hard to 
show that one case can be distinguished from 
another, that there are in fact cogent reasons 
to at least consider going down a slightly 
different path?  
 
So in the course of  this discussion about 
whether reforms to the dispute settlement 
system are necessary or desirable, I believe we 
need to have an honest conversation about 
when, where, and how, can, or should, the 
Appellate Body be told that it has gotten it 
wrong, at least to some degree.  Can we think 
about whether there is a mechanism to do 
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that, whether it within the DSB system itself, 
or whether it is in some more regularised 
annual or semi-annual process where there 
can be serious consideration about whether 
course correction is in order to provide a re-
balancing between stability and predictability 
and ensuring the rights and obligations of  the 
Members? When and how and where can the 
Appellate Body signal that it is hearing, that it 
is listening, that it is understanding these 
concerns, without compromising the 
independence of  the Appellate Body, which 
is, to me, of  paramount concern and interest? 
  
I'm not sure that we have ended up at the 
right balance. I do think that many of  the 
ideas underlying a system like the WTO’s 
dispute settlement system requires an 
Appellate Body that on the one hand can 
remain independent and not subject to undue 
pressure, but on the other hand has to remain 
part of  the system, able to hear and think 
about the concerns and the issues that are 
being raised by the Members. And that, to me, 
must be part of  the way forward.  We have to 
find some way in which there can be honest 
conversations about the shortcomings of  the 
WTO’s dispute settlement. We have to find a 
way to acknowledge that there is merit to 
some of  the concerns that have been raised 
by the United States (and others) over many 
years. While there can be complete 
condemnation of  the tactic that the United 
States has chosen to  block any process for 
reappointing Appellate Body members and 
agreement with Professor Petersmann’s 
analysis that such blocking illegally deprives 
Members of  the ability to carry out their duty 
to appoint Appellate Body Members under 
Article 17.2 of  the DSU (“The DSB shall 
appoint . . .”) I am concerned that the 
elevation of  the notion of  stability and 
predictability to the high place it now 
occupies has made it harder to make 
necessary reforms to the dispute settlement 
system.  The limited flexibility left in the 
system pushes down on or crowds out the 
ability for the kind of  course correction that I 
think we absolutely may need if  we're going 
to try to come to some kind of  a compromise 
that we leave us with a full and functioning 
Appellate Body and an improved dispute 
settlement system. 
 
I stand by my sense that the WTO dispute 
settlement system must be preserved and 
protected and that reforms must come before 
the Appellate Body is destroyed.  If  we allow 
the Appellate Body to disintegrate and the 
binding dispute settlement system to fail, I 
believe getting it back again will be far harder 
than making needed and helpful reforms now.  
I regret that I cannot be in Geneva with you, 
but hope that all who are gathered there can 
open your minds and think creatively about 
the changes that can and should be made to 
improve the system for everyone--to address 
the real concerns that have been raised and to 
prove that we can have a system that is 
flexible enough to restore the balance 
between stability and predictability on the one 
hand, and preserving the rights and 
obligations of  the Members on the other. 
43 | W H A T  K I N D  O F  D I S P U T E  S E T T L E M E N T  F O R  T H E  W T O ?  
 
Professor Robert Howse 
 
Sometimes it might seem to be just an 
indulgence of  academics to talk 
philosophically about urgent policy issues, but 
I do think that the issues before us today are 
sufficiently deep that it requires some 
stepping back and some more philosophical 
or big-picture thinking about what dispute 
settlement is, what its basis is, what the nature 
of  the rules are, before we can really evaluate 
some of  the more immediate and practical 
options for going forward. 
 
So I want to start with Alexandre Kojève, and 
those of  you who may have read the fine 
book by Petros Mavroidis and Doug Irwin 
"The Genesis of  the GATT" may know, 
Kojève was the Chair of  the Legal Drafting 
Group for the GATT. And he was one of  the 
most thoughtful thinkers about the meaning 
of  law and the relationship of  law to 
adjudication. So in a book that Kojève wrote a 
few years before getting involved in the 
drafting of  the GATT, "Esquisse d’une 
phénoménologie du droit", Kojève defines 
"droit" (or "law") in the normative sense as 
requiring or supposing that there is an 
impartial and disinterested third. According to 
Kojève, you can have arrangements based on 
power, arrangements based on economic 
convenience, but in order to have "droit", you 
have to have or at least be able to suppose you 
have, an impartial and disinterested third.  
Now, how do we know that a third, the 
adjudicator, is impartial and disinterested? 
Kojève takes a Kantian turn and says, "well, 
we can't look into the mind of  the 
adjudicator, we can't know the heart, and we 
can't know whether someone is acting or 
deciding purely out of  a motivation of  duty or 
on other kinds of  more interested or partial 
motivations". So the reason we can indeed 
think the possibility of  this independent and 
as he says impartial and disinterested judge is 
that we have a concept of  justice. And if, 
roughly speaking, the decision of  the judge 
corresponds to the relevant "community's” 
conception of  justice, which can include 
within it agreements but also disagreements 
on specific rules and norms, then 
phenomenologically, i.e. in appearance the 
judge will appear to be disinterested and 
impartial in the sense that their decision can 
be seen, broadly speaking, even though there 
is a winner and loser, as corresponding to the 
application conception of  justice. Thus, as a 
decision based on considerations of  justice 
alone.. Now let's look at whether we have a 
conception of  justice in the WTO. And here, 
we have to I think distinguish between, these 
are my categories, they are out for debate or 
argument, perhaps four kinds of  rules. 
 
First kind is the rules that sustain what one 
would call the liberalization contract. 
Bargained and bound concessions. All of  the 
apparatus surrounding interpretation of  
concessions, interpretation of  schedules, 
customs formalities and so on. There, I think 
there is a conception of  justice that is very 
analogous to default rules for contract in 
private law and the underlying conception of  
justice is really pacta sunt servanda, that we really 
need to have a background set of  norms to 
make sure that collective expectations, are 
actually met through the implementation of  
the contract. (Petros Mavroidis has often 
conceived of  the GATT or WTO as a 
“contract”-while I disagree that all the norms 
can be understood in such terms those related 
to bargained concession surely can be).   
 
Second kind of  rules: non-discrimination  
(National Treatment/MFN) and related 
norms, subject to public order, public policy 
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(the specific and General Exceptions). Here, I 
think there is also a conception of  justice, and 
again there will be disagreements about the 
balance, and Kojève had this idea of  his 
concept of  justice being a balance between 
the logic of  the market, and the logic of  social 
justice or government intervention for social 
goals, and this balance he thought would 
never be perfect or stable, but the conception 
of  justice behind national treatment, MFN 
applied in tandem with the General 
Exceptions, subject to public policy, is 
something like that balance. And that balance 
is struck in almost every system where there 
are rules about the regulation of  commerce 
that bind or constrain one or more levels of  
government. Whether the US constitution’s 
dormant commerce clause, or the EU, or 
other federal or regional systems. They all 
have some kind of  balance of  this sort. So 
there, there is a conception of  justice, which 
permits the balance to be struck in somewhat 
different ways in different economic, social 
and political systems. Concepts such as 
necessity, proportionality, “fit” define through 
the jurisprudence the outer limits of  
difference in the ways each Member can strike 
the balance; what might be called a “thin” 
concept of  justice is thus articulated; here in 
the US-Cloves case the Appellate Body cited 
the preamble of  the TBT Agreement as 
articulating the notion of  a balance between 
the right to regulate and trade liberalization, or 
market freedom. This thin concept of  justice, 
non-discrimination permissive of  different 
approaches to the relationship of  social 
regulation to market freedom, underpins the 
central notion of  pluralism in the WTO, 
which Professor Joanna Langille and I have 
developed in our joint scholarship 
 
A third set of  rules exists where one group of  
countries, based upon its power or leverage, 
has managed to impose its conception of  
justice in a certain way through the power 
politics of  trade. TRIPs is the clearest 
example. Now here you have a problem 
because, in implementing the rules, the 
disinterested and impartial third really 
impartial or disinterested, or are they, in fact, 
giving effect to a power move of  a set of  
countries that other countries have only 
agreed to under extreme pressure, or perhaps 
the expectation of  benefits that might never 
have come to them through linkage of  IP to 
other kinds of  concessions. Here, in a long 
article that I recently published in the 
European Journal for International Law, I 
proposed a theory of  how the Appellate Body 
has managed this problem, which is to be very 
emphatic about the importance of  provisions, 
even in these power-based rules, like IP rules, 
that suggest some balances or limitations, and 
to avoid teleological interpretations of  the 
rules, which might reinforce the overall 
perspective of  the powerful in pushing for 
these rules, namely maximization of  
intellectual property protection that it is 
necessarily a good thing. 
 
Now then we have rules in areas that were 
dealt with largely through self-help of  the 
GATT, and here I think there was a greater 
wisdom of  the GATT. This refers to anti-
dumping rules, subsidies rules, and so on, , 
and this is why I broadly agree with Jennifer 
Hillman that these should probably be 
removed from the Appellate Body, here there 
is no concept of  justice, I will argue 
controversially. Either one can look at these 
rules, as Sue Esserman and I did in a piece for 
Foreign Affairs a number of  years ago, as just 
bargained political compromises of  some 
sort. Or, one can look at them as an effort to 
create something that's impossible. 
 
The SCM Agreement benchmarks for what 
are legitimate or illegitimate subsidies without 
a competition policy. The EU has a 
competition policy. The WTO emphatically 
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does not, and that goes to there being no 
common concept of  justice upon which to 
premise dispute rulings concerning trade 
remedies.. Without a common concept of  
justice, and  these rules don't make sense. 
What does makes sense is self-help, because 
different countries have different views of  
fairness. You need some flexibility for 
individual countries to act unilaterally because 
we are in a realm where the common concept 
of  justice is not agreed, even in its basic 
outlines.  Because we don’t have a global 
competition charter, but because we don't 
have a global competition charter, the 
Appellate Body in deciding "rules cases" 
doesn't have a common theory of  justice or 
an underlying concept of  justice, so, at its 
best, it merely resorts to proceduralism, 
checking that the underlying domestic 
procedures are not corrupt, irrational, 
arbitrary, and so on. That's reasonable, 
because that's a minimum sense of  
administrative justice, that's almost implied in 
the  idea of  the rule of  law itself. But once 
you get into the substantive norms and 
benchmarks, without the underpinning of  a 
competition policy, which obviously takes a 
view of  justice of  the relationship between 
equivalence, the logic of  market outcomes vs 
other norms, you don't have the basis for the 
judge being able to, be shown to, be an 
impartial and disinterested third, and that puts 
the judge in an impossible position, because 
without that common idea of  justice against 
which to check the ruling, the judge will 
always be regarded by the party that loses as 
perhaps not entirely impartial and 
disinterested. 
 
So here I think we have to leave room, 
especially for some role for self-help, and at 
least not to micro-manage the substantive 
standards, to give some play to the checking 
or verification that administrative justice is 
happening, but to acknowledge that there 
cannot be a real juridical decision often using 
benchmarks that are economically incoherent 
and simply paper-over different conceptions 
of  political and economic systems.  
 
That brings me to the fourth situation, which 
is the situation in a way that underlies the 
dispute settlement crisis, and here I agree with 
Robert McDougall who is going to talk later, 
that we cannot really divorce the issue of  the 
broader crisis from the issue of  the dispute 
settlement crisis, because, in fact, what we 
have is a situation where the WTO rules have 
become entangled in geopolitical conflict. 
 
We were lucky with the GATT because we 
had the cold war and the eastern countries 
weren't in the system, so the kind of  open-
ended geopolitical conflict that we now see 
between the US and China, that kind of  
problem did not exist in the GATT-era. The 
GATT system was sheltered from it, 
geopolitical conflict was elsewhere in the 
United Nations, in the arms control regime, 
There were some cases where it spilled over, 
on Nicaragua for instance, but in general fairly 
isolated and protected against that. But now 
we have it entangled, and the EU and some 
others try and suggest, ok let's have some 
more rules, lets try and nail down rules that 
are more precise or detailed, or adequate 
about subsidies or state enterprises. This is a 
hopeless venture and it will lead to less 
legitimacy for the dispute settlement 
authorities, because the rules cannot be 
underpinned by a concept of  justice. That 
concept of  justice stems from each social and 
political system, which views the meaning of  
the market, the meaning of  private and public, 
in fundamentally different ways, and the 
differences are just exacerbated by geopolitical 
conflicts that aren't even trade conflicts. So 
there I agree fully with Frieder Roessler's 
suggestion that we have to look at the 
flexibilities of  the initial GATT system where 
you can't really have dispute settlement that 
appears impartial and disinterested, you solve 
the problem by some kind of  political 
arrangement or deal between the conflicting 
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parties, which preserves the integrity of  the 
rest of  the system against this kind of  conflict 
filtering into it, contaminating it, and making 
the adjudicative function not to seem, any 
longer, fully disinterested and impartial. And 
as I recall WTO Director General Roberto 
Azevedo has actually said that it makes sense 
that the US and China would work out their 
geopolitically-related trade conflict, the 
national security dimension and so on, 
through bilateral deal-making.  And, in so, I 
would finally say, that if  we understand the 
problems of  the last two kinds of  sets of  
rules posed, that we should be asking for less, 
not for more, from the system. Less is more, 
because less here means avoiding the 
adjudicator being put down the path where 
they are in fact choosing between the use of  
justice or between different social and political 
and economic approaches. And I think that 
that is the root to true delegitimization. I am 
actually more worried about that than I am 
worried about no compulsory jurisdiction, 
because Kojève distinguished between 
"enforcement", between making, as he put it, 
"irresistible" the decision of  the impartial and 
disinterested third, and the necessity of  the 
impartial and disinterested third for purposes 
of  having a true “droit” or justice. Sure, you 
may not have full compulsory jurisdiction, it is 
very hard to come by in international law, but 
the many actors who rely on the rules and set 
their expectations and behaviour according to 
them. Ruti Teitel and I have explored this in 
our essay “Beyond Compliance” and related 
writing. If  there is an impartial and 
disinterested third, even if  some countries 
don't enforce, even if  some countries can't be 
dragged into court all of  the time, you have a 
sense of  order that is underpinned by what 
Kojève called "droit" in real law. .And the 
"raison d'être" for me in doing this kind of  
research and being in this field for almost 30 
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Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
 
The WTO Appellate Body (AB) crisis caused 
by the illegal ‘blocking’ of  the filling of  AB 
vacancies risks leading to a breakdown of  the 
WTO legal and dispute settlement system by 
the end of  2019. This is due to the fact that - 
if  the Appellate Body becomes dysfunctional 
as of  December 2019 - then also panel 
reports risk no longer being adopted pursuant 
to Article 16.4 DSU; if  appealed and without 
an Appellate Body report, also panel reports 
risk never being adopted. I shall briefly 
discuss the four basic policy options, which 
WTO diplomats have in responding to the 
illegal ‘blocking’ of  AB vacancies, which 
violates not only the legal obligations (e.g. 
under Articles 3, 17, 23 DSU) to protect the 
AB system, but also the democratic mandates 
given by parliaments when they approved the 
WTO Agreement and gave limited mandates 
to WTO institutions and WTO diplomats to 
implement and modernize, but not to destroy 
the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Resolving this political threat to ‘security and 
predictability of  the multilateral trading 
system’ (Article 3 DSU) should be based on 
the following four principles underlying WTO 
law and the universal recognition of  human 
rights by UN and WTO members. 
 
1.  The first principle is: Respect the limited, 
democratic mandates given to WTO institutions and 
to WTO diplomats when parliaments approved 
the WTO Agreements and mandated their 
governments to ‘ensure the conformity of  … 
laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with … obligations as provided in 
the annexed Agreements’ (Article XVI:4 
WTO Agreement). In contrast to GATT 
1947, parliaments approved WTO law and 
incorporated it (e.g. in the EU and USA) into 
domestic legal systems. Also the US trade 
promotion legislation of  2015 has given 
neither a legal nor a democratic mandate to 
trade diplomats to destroy the WTO legal and 
dispute settlement system. The WTO 
Agreement not only implements (e.g. in 
Article III) this limited delegation of  separate 
legislative, administrative and judicial powers. 
It also limits the ‘practice of  decision-making 
by consensus followed under GATT 1947’ by 
prescribing majority voting in Article IX:1, 
notably for administrative and judicial 
decision-making as acknowledged, inter alia, in 
the 2003 WTO procedures for the 
appointment of  the Director-General and in 
the working procedures for WTO dispute 
settlement panels and the AB. The WTO rules 
for compulsory, international and national 
jurisdictions for judicial settlement of  WTO 
disputes based on rule of  law limit executive 
trade policy powers; they are ‘a central 
element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading 
system’ (Article 3:2 DSU). WTO dispute 
settlement bodies and their members have 
acknowledged these judicial constraints since 
1995. Trade agreements without legal 
enforcement mechanisms risk not only 
becoming ineffective, as emphasized by USTR 
Lighthizer. The illegal obstruction by the DSB 
of  the AB system undermines also the 
limited, democratic mandate given to WTO 
diplomats and to WTO institutions. 
 
2.  The second principle is: Respect rule of  
law as defined in WTO law. Since 2017, the DSB 
violates its collective legal duties under Article 
17 DSU that the AB ‘shall be composed of  
seven persons’, and vacancies ‘shall be filled as 
they arise’, so that ‘the Appellate Body 
membership (is) broadly representative of  
membership in the WTO’. The US blocking 
of  the appointment of  AB candidates on 
grounds unrelated to their personal 
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qualifications – and without providing any 
evidence that AB reports have not complied 
with their legal and judicial mandates (e.g. to 
clarify WTO rules in conformity with the 
customary rules of  treaty interpretation) - 
violates the US legal obligations under the 
DSU (e.g. Articles 3, 17 and 23). The US 
Trump administration’s denial of  ‘judicial 
functions’ of  WTO dispute settlement bodies, 
like its insistence on alleged ‘historical US 
interpretations’ of  WTO rules disregarding 
the customary rules of  treaty interpretation, 
reflect hegemonic power politics aimed at 
increasing US leverage for renegotiating what 
President Trump describes as ‘the terrible 
WTO Agreement’. Even if  other WTO 
members cannot prevent US power politics 
disregarding multilateral treaties, they should 
respect their democratic and legal mandates to 
protect the WTO legal, dispute settlement and 
trading system as one of  the most important 
‘global public goods’ for promoting 
‘sustainable development’ and poverty 
reduction for the benefit of  citizens all over 
the world. 
 
3.  Respect for the separation of  legislative, 
administrative and judicial powers in WTO law 
requires all WTO Members to proceed as 
prescribed in Article IX:1 of  the WTO 
Agreement, i.e. to complete the filling of  AB 
vacancies by ‘a majority of  the votes cast’ so 
as to terminate the illegal blockage of  AB 
appointments. Article IX:1 was designed to 
limit illegal abuses of  veto powers in 
administrative decision-making procedures. 
The explicit WTO requirements for majority 
decisions - if  consensus cannot be reached - 
in administrative decision-making (e.g. on the 
appointment of  WTO Directors-General, the 
completion of  the composition of  WTO 
panels by decisions of  the DG) as well as in 
judicial decisions (e.g. of  WTO panels and AB 
divisions) do not affect ‘the practice of  
consensus followed under GATT 1947’ and 
under the WTO for political and legislative 
decision-making procedures (as prescribed in 
Article IX:1 WTO Agreement). As long as the 
DSU reform negotiations since 1998 do not 
lead to agreed DSU amendments, 
implementing the existing rules and protecting 
the existing institutions (like the AB) is even 
more necessary. Contrary to the political US 
claims, there is no evidence that the AB has 
violated its mandate to review ‘issues of  law 
covered in the panel report and legal 
interpretations developed by the panel’ 
(Article 17:6 DSU), for instance by 
disregarding the customary rules of  treaty 
interpretations or the quasi-judicial AB 
mandate for ‘prompt settlement’ of  WTO 
disputes as prescribed in Articles 3 and 17 
DSU. This judicial function requires the AB 
not only to clarify WTO rules, which trade 
negotiators left incomplete and often 
indeterminate; it also justifies exceeding the 90 
day deadline inserted into Article 17:5 DSU 
(at the request of  US negotiators back in 
1993) if  political WTO practices (e.g. the 
illegal diminution of  the number of  AB 
members) make it impossible for the AB to 
meet such unreasonable, unprecedented 
deadlines imposed on complex judicial 
proceedings by US trade diplomats. The 
‘legitimacy challenges’ of  the ‘AB crisis’ result 
from political governance failures and WTO 
power politics rather than from ‘judicial 
failures’, especially if  WTO governments 
persistently adopt AB legal findings without 
proposing ‘authoritative interpretations’ 
(Article IX:2 WTO Agreement) preventing 
precedential effects of  judicial interpretations 
that governments consider to be politically 
inadequate. The fact that the US has neither 
proposed such ‘authoritative interpretations’, 
nor attempted to have them adopted by the 
‘three-fourths majority of  the Members’ 
prescribed in Article IX:2, reflects the 
hegemonic power politics pursued by the 
Trump administration. Just as, in 2003, the 
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WTO Ministerial Conference adopted 
procedures for the appointment of  the 
Director-General providing for majority 
decisions (as prescribed in Article IX:1 WTO 
Agreement) if  consensus cannot be reached, 
it is time for the WTO members to adopt a 
majoritarian ‘authoritative interpretation’ 
confirming that AB vacancies ‘shall be filled 
as they arise’ (Article 17:2 DSU), if  necessary 
by majority voting in conformity with Article 
IX WTO. 
  
4. Finally, the WTO remains a pragmatic 
institution, as illustrated by the mandate given 
to Ambassador Walker to facilitate an agreed 
political resolution of  the AB crisis. Yet, the 
political proposals made by Prof. Jennifer 
Hillman – i.e. to take away the AB jurisdiction 
for safeguard measures and anti-dumping 
measures, or to establish a special AB division 
dealing with these issues – would require 
amendments of  the DSU, which are – for 
good reasons – not supported by most WTO 
members, for instance in view of  the lack of  
any coherent economic or legal justification 
of  this proposed amendment of  WTO law. 
The fact that many WTO members adversely 
affected by the US imposition, in 2018, of  
discriminatory tariffs on steel and aluminium 
have challenged these illegal invocations of  
Article XXI GATT through WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings rather suggests an 
increasing willingness to defend the rule of  
law among WTO members against hegemonic 
power politics undermining the global public 
good of  the rules-based WTO legal, dispute 
settlement and trading system.  
 
My answer to the question posed to this Panel 
is: The WTO dispute settlement system 
continues to better protect the WTO 
objective of  ‘providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading 
system’ than intergovernmental power 
politics. The four policy options to respond to 
the WTO governance and AB crises – i.e. (1) 
member-driven governance (e.g. aimed at 
agreed DSU reforms); (2) administrative 
majority decisions filling the AB vacancies; (3) 
judicial remedies against illegal power politics 
(as illustrated by the 9 WTO panel 
proceedings reviewing the US import 
restrictions on steel and aluminium); and (4) 
WTO pragmatism (e.g. using agreed panel and 
arbitration proceedings as a substitute if  AB 
procedures may no longer be available) – offer 
WTO members adequate, political and legal 
means for resolving the current WTO 
governance and AB crises in conformity with 
the four ‘constitutional principles’ underlying 
the WTO legal, dispute settlement and trading 
system, as discussed above. Unfortunately, the 
‘pragmatic, collective DSU violations’ by 
WTO members since 2017 have failed to 
protect ‘public reason’ and rule-of-law in the 
WTO. The more ‘aggressive US unilateralism’ 
and Chinese ‘state capitalism’ and 
‘bilateralism’ (e.g. in the context of  China’s 
‘Belt and Road agreements’ with more than 70 
WTO members) challenge the multilateral 
WTO legal and economic paradigms of  a 
non-discriminatory, rules-based world trading 
system, the more necessary becomes ‘WTO 
leadership’ for defending the rule of  law as 
defined by democratic parliaments when they 
approved the WTO Agreement. Both Anglo-
Saxon neo-liberalism and Chinese state-
capitalism neglect ‘market failures’ as well as 
‘governance failures’ to the detriment of  
citizens demanding transnational rule of  law 
and promotion of  inclusive consumer welfare 
through undistorted, citizen-driven economic 
markets as well as ‘democratic political 
markets’. From this democratic citizen 
perspective interpreting WTO governance as 
a ‘principal-agent relationship’ between 
citizens (as ‘constituent powers’ of  legitimate 
legal systems and ‘democratic principals’) and 
governance institutions with limited, delegated 
powers, WTO reforms are obviously 
necessary (e.g. for limiting market distortions 
by state-owned enterprises, subsidies, 
discriminatory government procurement, 
abuses or theft of  intellectual property rights). 
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Even if  judicial interpretations underlying ad 
hoc dispute settlement rulings may need to be 
corrected through democratic legislation, the 
WTO dispute settlement system continues to 
deserve legal and democratic protection 
against illegal, intergovernmental power 
politics. The WTO objective of  ‘sustainable 
development’ cannot be realized unless 
citizens, democratic institutions and WTO 
diplomats defend transnational rule of  law in 
conformity with the ‘constitutional principles’ 
underlying UN and WTO law, at least among 
the 163 WTO Members willing to comply 
with their DSU obligations so as to protect 
the reasonable interests of  their citizens in a 
rules-based world trading system. The 
justified US demands for reforming the WTO 
legal system in order to better discipline 
authoritarian market distortions (e.g. by 
China), trade protectionism (e.g. by India) and 
violations of  WTO law (e.g. notification 
requirements) by other WTO members do 
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Mr Frieder Roessler 
 
Appointing Appellate Body Members by 
Majority Vote? 
My co-panelists Professor Jennifer Hillman 
and Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann agree 
that the WTO Ministerial Conference has the 
power to appoint new members of the 
Appellate Body by vote if no consensus could 
be reached in the DSB. While Professor 
Petersmann considers that the Members of 
the WTO are legally obliged to resort  to 
voting if this is the only means to avoid an 
existential crisis of the WTO dispute 
settlement system,6 Professor Hillman 
considers voting even under those 
circumstances to be problematic.  In her view, 
 
Going to voting - even for the limited 
purpose of appointing Appellate 
Body members  - puts Members  in 
the difficult position of choosing 
between abandoning the preferred 
consensus approach versus the 
obligation to fill seats on the 
Appellate Body and potentially raises 
the concern that other more 
substantive issues will soon follow as 
matters subject to voting.7 
 
Professor Hillman’s concern is probably 
shared by many WTO Members. There is a 
widespread fear that any departure from the 
hitherto strictly observed consensus practice 
                                                          
6 E.U. Petersmann „How should the EU and other 
WTO Members react to their WTO governance and 
WTO Appellate Body crises?“ Published by the 
European University Institute as EUI Working Paper 
RSCAS 2018/71. 
7 J. Hillman „Three Approaches to Fixing the WTO’s 
Appellate Body: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly?“ 
Institute of International Economic Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center, December 2018. 
would open the door to voting on any matter, 
that decision-making in the WTO would then 
be dominated by the formation of coalitions 
rather than efforts to negotiate a common 
position and that Members might have to 
assume new obligations they had not 
accepted. 
 
I would like to examine whether that fear is 
justified. 
 
According to Article IX of  the WTO 
Agreement, the WTO „shall continue the 
practice of decision-making by consensus 
followed under the GATT“. This provision 
implies that the drafters of the WTO 
Agreement were satisfied with the way 
decisions were adopted under the GATT and 
that they expected the WTO to follow the 
example of the GATT. What precisely was the 
consensus-making practice of the GATT? 
And did the WTO continue that practice? 
 
I observed for the first time how consensus-
making worked in the GATT at meeting of 
the GATT Council of Representatives in 
1975. Australia proposed at that meeting that 
a consultative group on trade in meat be 
established.  Its proposal had already been  
discussed on previous occasions and the 
Chairman of the Council, Mr Sahlgren from 
Finland, therefore did not expect to hear 
anything new. He leaned comfortably back in 
his chair and lit a cigar. Sure enough, the EC  
and Japan once again said that the Australian 
proposal was interesting but needed to be 
further examined. Then something completely 
unexpected happened. The Australian 
representative raised his flag and said: „Mr 
Chairman, I have been instructed to ask for a 
vote on our proposal“. Mr Sahlgren almost 
lost his cigar, hesitated a moment and then 
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said calmly: „Well, I suggest that we have a tea 
on this matter.“  That tea lasted four days. 
Then the Council meeting resumed and the 
Consultative Group on meat was established - 
by consensus.8 
 
This was not the only instance in which a 
formal request to adopt a decision by vote 
was made. In 1985 Brazil, India and other 
developing countries objected to the 
convening of a special session of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES to discuss  the 
modalities of a new round of trade 
negotiations. When it became clear that no 
consensus on the matter could be reached, the 
United States formally requested the 
Chairman of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES to convene the special session.  
The Chairman, pointing out that this request 
needed to be concurred in by the majority of 
the contracting parties, invited the contracting 
parties which concur with that request to so 
inform him not later than 31 August 1985.9  
This prompted Brazil, India and the other 
developing countries to withdraw their 
objections and the Session was convened 
without a prior vote. 
 
Consensus was thus achieved under the GATT 
against the background of a possible vote. Of course, 
consensus was always the goal and long, often 
night-long, informal meetings were dedicated 
to the discovery of solutions acceptable to all. 
Some meetings went on until the delegations 
with flexible instructions had gone home to 
sleep and the matter could be discussed 
among representatives of contracting parties 
                                                          
8 It is interesting to note that the minutes of the 
Council do not mention Australia’s request for a vote.  
They merely note that the meeting was suspended to 
permit an informal drafting group to discuss the terms 
of reference of the proposed group (GATT document 
C/M/103, 18 February  1975, page 8). 
9 GATT document GATT/AIR/2180, 26 July 1985. 
with a significant stake in the matter. At one 
of these meetings at four o’clock in the 
morning, thinking friendly of my bed, I 
reached the conclusion that decision-making 
by consensus really meant decision-making by 
exhaustion and that this method distributed 
the influence in decision-making in 
accordance with the real importance each 
contracting party attached to the matter to be 
decided. That was the reason why consensus-
making was far superior to the formal one-
contracting party-one-vote system set out in 
the General Agreement. Given the wide 
variety of issues before the GATT a formal 
voting system reflecting each contracting 
party’s stake in each of the matters to be 
decided could not have been devised. 
However, the consensus-making practice of 
the GATT generally operated in a manner 
that came fairly close to such a system. 
 
Majority decisions were never proposed or 
considered for the purpose of imposing new 
trade policy obligations on unwilling 
contracting parties. A Secretariat note on the 
launching and organisation of trade 
negotiations circulated in 1985 made clear that 
„while the CONTRACTING PARTIES may, 
with a simple majority, decide to conduct, 
sponsor or support multilateral negotiations, 
they do not have the power to oblige 
individual contracting parties to accept new 
substantive obligations as a result of such 
negotiations.“10 While majority votes to impose new 
trade policy obligations on a minority of contracting 
parties were thus legally excluded, majority votes on 
institutional matters were a possibility each negotiator 
had to take into account. 
 
This GATT practice is reflected in WTO law.  
Amendments of the WTO agreements take 
effect in principle only for the Members that 
                                                          
10 GATT document Spec (85) 46, 26 September 1985, 
page 1 
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have accepted them;11 however, amendments 
that are „of a nature that would not alter the 
rights and obligations of the Member, shall 
take effect for all Members upon acceptance 
by two thirds of the Members“.12 Members 
are thus not obliged to accept new trade 
policy obligations against their will, but 
individual Members cannot prevent an 
amendment of a provision that regulates such 
matters as the administration of the WTO, the 
activity of its organs or the use of its 
resources. The GATT practice is also 
reflected in the procedures for the 
appointment of the Director-General, 
adopted by the WTO. They make clear that, if 
it has not been possible for the General 
Council to take a decision by consensus by 
the deadline for the appointment, Members 
should consider the possibility of recourse to 
a vote as a last resort.13  
 
I think that a wise compromise was found in 
the decision-making practices of the GATT 
and the WTO law reflecting those practices:  
A Member of the WTO cannot be forced to 
accept new policy obligations but it may also 
not prevent other Members from assuming 
new obligations in the framework of the 
WTO. A Member need not use the WTO for 
the realisation of its policy objectives but it 
may also not prevent the WTO from 
performing its functions for other Members. 
If voting is a priori excluded under all 
circumstances the benefits of that 
compromise are lost. Each Member is then 
effectively given the right to extract policy 
concessions from other Members by 
threatening to bring some or all the 
operations of the WTO to a halt for all 
Members, for instance by vetoing 
amendments acceptable to other Members, 
blocking decisions launching a trade 
                                                          
11 Article X:3 of the WTO Agreement 
12 Article X:4 of the WTO Agreement 
13 WTO document WT/L/509, 20 January 2003, 
paragraph 20 
negotiation or refusing to approve the WTO 
budget, to appoint the Director General or 
the members of the Appellate Body. The very 
existence of the WTO would then be at risk. 
 
To conclude: The Members of the WTO 
overwhelmingly favour consensus-making; I 
therefore  do not believe that an appointment 
of Appellate Body members by majority vote 
would provoke an avalanche of requests for 
votes on other matters and spell the end of 
the consensus approach. The WTO does not 
have the power to oblige individual Members 
to accept new policy obligations through 
majority decisions, and this has never been 
attempted. I therefore see no basis for the 
concern that, if Appellate Body members 
were appointed by majority vote, other more 
substantive issues would follow as matters 
subject to voting.    
 
If consensus-making remains an objective, the 
WTO will benefit; however, if consensus-
making is understood to require unanimity, it 
invites abuse and the WTO will suffer. 
Recourse to voting must therefore remain a 
possibility. Members agreed that, in the 
process of appointing the Director-General, 
their overriding objective shall be to reach 
decisions by consensus but at the same time 
provided for the possibility of recourse to a 
vote.14 This approach should in my view also 
govern the appointment of Appellate Body 
members.
                                                          
14 WTO document WT/L/509, 20 January 2003, 
paragraphs 3 and 20 
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Prof  Georges Abi-Saab  
 
Jo, dear friends I feel here like a student sitting 
for an exam, because the subject that was put 
to us:  “Has the WTO Dispute Settlement 
made a useful contribution to the rule of  law 
and the development of  international law ?”, 
sounds like a good exam question, and when I 
read it on my way in, I thought I'll answer it in 
the same way as the good student I used to 
be. But the chairman says we have to look to 
the future, rather than backward. I'll try to put 
some projection into my answer. But I have 
first to answer the question as it stands, which 
is in two parts. First part, “Has the WTO 
Dispute Settlement contributed to the rule of  
law?” And my answer is definitely yes. And 
the reason is not legal; the reason is simply 
because for a long time it was the only major 
regulatory system which included the main 
powers, particularly the United States, with 
compulsory jurisdiction for the settlement of  
disputes. It was the only one, and it was an 
acceptance of  jurisdiction covering the whole 
field, not only over a special issue here or 
there. And this is of  course a great 
contribution to ingraining the rule of  law in 
practice. You ingrain it here you ingrain it 
there and the total effect is that the rule of  
law becomes the rule rather than the 
exception.  
 But what do we have now? We are facing, 
and here I speak about the future, we are 
facing, an effort to undo that system, to undo 
this part which really locked the system on to 
progress. When I was in the Appellate Body  
and asked to speak about the system, I usually 
used my favourite analogy in the development 
of  the law, which is the movement along the 
Darwinian institutional evolutionary curve. 
This curve  started with GATT which didn't 
manage to go beyond the stage of  an open-
ended system of  settlement of  disputes; in 
spite  of  the change of  denominations from 
“study group” to “working group” to “panel”. 
But what did these panels do? They did 
reports which had to be accepted by 
consensus including the two disputing parties. 
So it was not really arbitration. It didn't have 
the genes of  judiciality.  It was, at best, 
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technically, from the point of  view of  general 
international law, a system of  conciliation. 
True, conciliation panels, unlike mediation, 
take a little bit of  distance from the parties, 
and make recommendation after that, which 
are in many cases inspired by law, but not 
only. However their decision is not obligatory, 
it is not  what we call technically, res judicata, 
and if  is not res judicata the process is not 
arbitration, it's a different animal. We should 
not confuse fish with fowl.  
At one point, in this movement along the 
Darwinian curve, occurs what is called a 
“quantum leap”, and the quantum  leap in the 
Marrakesh Agreements is a change of  one 
word which is an adjective, from “positive”  to 
“negative” consensus. Because this locked up  
the system and made its decisions final, and 
thus  ingrained  the DNA of  judiciality in the 
system. To continue with the same analogy, 
suddenly the system transmuted from an 
invertebrate animal to a vertebrate one. Now 
what is happening is that the American assault 
on the system tries to reverse the movement 
along the Darwinian curve and bring it back 
to the invertebrate stage, by blowing up the 
lock on top of  the institutional system and 
making it open-ended again.  
I heard one of  the speakers before me, I think 
it's Mr Philippe De Baere, discussing the 
different the arguments about arbitration, 
under Article 25. That is really Darwinian 
regression, from the point of  view of  the rule 
of  law; by making the acceptance of  the final 
outcome of  the process dependent on the 
prior consent, i.e. agreement, of  both parties 
to submit to arbitration any particular case.  
So we are facing here really a Gordian knot, a 
cruel choice, which is, either to save the legal 
integrity of  the system at the expense of  
excluding the US; not necessarily by getting 
formally out of  the system, but even by its 
staying in, but playing the persistance 
objector,  putting obstacles and making it 
really unworkable; or in the alternative, to 
accommodate the US and thus regress into a 
system which is really a reflection of  pure 
power politics. So that is my answer to the 
first part of  the question.  
What has the system contributed to the 
development of  international law?” And my 
answer is equally in the affirmative; but the 
contribution is limited and somewhat oblique; 
not so much in substantive law, rather in the 
field of  procedure.  The Appellate Body has 
been quite innovative, and developed patterns 
which are being referred to as  “best 
practices”, inspiring other fora; a very 
important contribution in the present era of  
proliferation of  international courts and 
tribunals. I'll just mention two examples. One 
is the practise invented by the Appellate Body, 
of  “exchange of  views”, associating members 
not sitting in a division with the case under 
consideration, which is very good for the 
coherence of  the jurisprudence of  large 
tribunals functioning through smaller 
chambers, panels or divisions.  The other 
example is in the marshalling and 
administration of  proof, particularly in 
scientific matters.  Here again, much good 
work was done and best practices developed; 
to the point that, in a case before the 
International Court of  Justice, the Paper pulp 
mill case, where the question was about the 
scientific proof  of  the degree of  pollution of  
water by the paper industry, a field in which 
there is a lack of  experience in international 
judicial practice, two judges,  Bruno Simma 
and Al-Khasawneh, wrote a dissenting 
opinion saying that the court had to be more 
activist in marshalling scientific proof  and  to 
be inspired by the practice of  the AB of  the 
WTO.   
As concerns the  contribution, to substantive 
law,  the system has been very good in 
precising and  refining the new problem  (it's 
not really new, but gaining in importance) of  
the modes of  interaction between special 
regimes and general international law. For 
example, in Hormones, the handling of  the 
precautionary principle, and whether it is 
applicable in WTO law, the Appellate Body 
said very clearly,  `We cannot judge on a 
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principle which does not belong to our field; 
if  the organizations, which are specialised in 
that field decide that this is a general principle 
of  international law, then we may take it into 
consideration.” But even then if  you have a 
special rule, a lex specialis , it will derogate a 
general rule unless it is  jus cogens . But it is 
not for the trade regime to recognize or 
decide on   the customary character or the jus 
cogens character of  a rule which does not 
belong to trade law. Thus, the AB refined a 
little bit further the analysis; and this was later 
almost the same argument that was made by 
the International Court of  Justice in analysing 
the relationship between itself  and the ICTY 
as concerns the interpretation of  general 
international law and international criminal 
law.
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Prof  Gabrielle Marceau 
 
I'm speaking to you in my personal capacity. 
You've asked me to talk about the past and 
the future. With respect to the past, the expert 
before me made a number of  interesting and 
valuable comments.  
 
A few years ago, I researched how often the 
Appellate Body (AB) reports had been cited 
by other tribunals and; it's quite impressive, at 
the time close to 150 disputes referred to AB 
reports.  For example, those judgments from 
other tribunals referred to WTO case law on 
"like products", or on "sustainable 
development", which is mentioned in the 
WTO preamble. I decided to entitle my 
published article (about the AB jurisprudence) 
"The Boat light in the international 
fragmentation" – it says it all.  Other tribunals 
also referred to the Appellate Body's 
reasoning when it allowed amicus curiae 
submissions and open hearings.  The ICJ 
talked about the way WTO panels handle 
experts, as a good model to follow.  In the 
Japan - Whales case, the ICJ made use of  the 
WTO standard of  review in the Hormones 
suspension dispute.  A couple of  years ago 
UNCTAD invited me to a meeting with 
delegates who wanted to know how to change 
investment arbitration, so their arbitrators can 
work in the same way as the panels and the 
AB do in making use of  the rules and 
principles of  the Vienna Convention on 
Treaties (VCLT) and the general principle of  
sustainable development.  I explained that is 
not so simple because we have an explicit 
reference to sustainable development in the 
WTO preamble and to the VCLT in the DSU. 
Other tribunals have often referred to the 
WTO panelist selection process as a model to 
follow as there is no possibility for a party to 
block the nomination process because there 
either party can ask the Director General to 





Finally, you all remember that for the last two 
years the EU has been recommending the 
creation of  a world court on investment 
matters, based on the model of  the WTO AB 
system.  It speaks for itself. There are also 
many areas where the WTO substantive rules 
are models for other regimes. For example, 
the WTO system of  rules on international 
standards is also an amazing model: indeed, 
under the WTO, the TBT and SPS 
agreements give legal value to international 
standards negotiated outside the WTO by 
international standardising bodies: that is 
when a domestic standard complies with an 
international standard, it is presumed to be 
WTO-consistent and justified, even if  it 
restricts trade.  This is a beautiful and even 
outstanding example of  international 
coherence.  To me it is clear that the WTO 
system and its dispute settlement system can 
be quoted as an impressive model.  
 
Now the future: what will happen in 
December if  there are no incoming members 
to replace the Appellate Body members 
whose term of  office finishes? To answer this 
question properly, I think it is important to 
remember the multiple dimensions of  the 
WTO dispute settlement.  We have to think if  
the Appellate Body goes, what is going or not 
going with it? Will we lose this impressive 
reverse consensus or negative consensus or 
automaticity? Second, my favourite, the DSB 
and the multilateral surveillance of  
implementation and monitored retaliation – 
will we also lose them? There is no other 
international dispute system where after a 
judgement of  a tribunal, the membership 
continues to survey or supervise the 
implementation process.  The way the DSB 
covers several stages of  the DS process is also 
unique, as is the system whereby the 
retaliation level is monitored by the 
membership and where the level of  sanctions 
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in response to a violation of  rules is 
controlled by arbitration. So in the WTO the 
international law system of  countermeasures 
that is always beneficial to powerful countries 
does not apply in the circumstances regulated 
through the Article 22 arbitration process. In 
addition, we have cross-retaliation. 
 
My young colleagues seem often to think that 
other international tribunals work like the 
WTO dispute settlement system. If  Members 
cannot settle this AB selection process issue, 
are we going to lose all that? Because it's not 
just the Appellate Body that we will lose. And 
of  course, the Appellate Body itself  is an 
impressive creation. 
 
Finally, is it possible to solve the problem? 
Well who am I to say yes or no? I personally 
think that there may be issues in the Appellate 
Body, but the problem, as said by Philippe De 
Baere, Freider Roessler and others, is much 
broader.  The problem is geopolitics, and 
solving this  bigger and broader problem 
involves the need for, inter alia, new rules on  
subsidies, and you know the issue of  "public 
body" is not just an issue of  interpretation of  
the SCM, it is  a broader issue which the 
OECD refers to as "competitive neutrality", 
there is also the issue of  E-commerce, 
investment, the status of  developing countries 
and all that.  
 
So I think that, contrary to what others have 
said, it's necessary to deal with all those other 
issues, or at least part of  that, in order to deal 
with the stalled AB selection process.  Or at 
least those concerns appear to be relevant to 
the position of  a main player.  
 
My last point is that if  there is one issue that 
could be dealt with in dispute settlement, it's 
that of  the "standard of  review"; because as 
Rob Howse said, if  the Hormones standard of  
review - requiring that the WTO panel 
ensures that the national authorities had 
adopted an articulated rigorous decision that 
could be based on minority views - was 
followed in all areas of  the WTO, with shorter 
reports. I think his point was that if  the 
Hormones standard of  review had been 
followed in the zeroing cases, or under article 
2.2 of  TBT where now panels seem to be 
asked to review the actual degree of  
contribution of  the challenged measure the 
outcomes may be different. I'm not sure, 
maybe I misunderstood. 
 
I will end by saying that I as wrote that a few 
years ago, the WTO dispute settlement system 
and its AB phase are a model and have been a 
model in international law - it's difficult to 
deny this. There is a crisis now in the WTO 
with its dispute settlement system, and this 
crisis is more than procedural.  I just hope 
that people take the right decisions, and of  
course it's not the Secretariat that takes those 
decisions. I hope that those in power to 
decide realize that the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System has a lot of  extraordinary 
dimensions in addition to the Appellate Body, 
such as the reversed consensus, the 
multilateral surveillance mechanism of  the 
DSB during the implementation period and 
the institutional control over retaliation, which 
we could lose in addition to losing the 
Appellate Body  if  a solution is not found.  
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Mr Robert McDougall 
 
On the question that is before us -- about 
whether it's made a useful contribution on the 
rule of law and the development of 
international law -- I agree with the positive 
assessment of others. I was going to 
enumerate a number of different positive 
contributions, but for the sake of time and 
not being cut off by a strict Chair, I'll just say 
that I agree with all of those positive 
assessments and focus more on the “dark side 
of the moon” as a previous speaker has said. 
The positive contribution is not going to 
interfere with my discussion anyway. We have 
regular anniversary events, celebrating what 
has been done, and obviously in the current 
environment we need to think about the 
future, as the Chair has said, and think about 
some of the constraints on the dispute 
settlement system. I think that probably at this 
point it is more important to do so, so I'm 
going to raise 4 issues following the lines of 
constraints.  
The first is the question whether or not there is 
a contribution to the development of 
international law and the rule of law. I wonder 
whether that is even the right question in the 
current environment? Are these ends in 
themselves and are they the ultimate objectives 
of the dispute settlement mechanism? Would 
the evaluation of the dispute settlement 
mechanism be different if we asked broader 
question, such as "does the dispute settlement 
mechanism operate effectively in the service of 
trade cooperation”? On that -- and Professor 
Hillman raised this point earlier and I would 
agree with her -- the judicialization of dispute 
settlement of the WTO has generally and 
correctly been celebrated as a positive 
development in trade relations. 
But perhaps judicialized dispute settlement has 
taken on too much importance in the WTO. 
Too much importance both relative to other  
 
 
forms of dispute settlement such as mediation 
and conciliation, which was more prominent 
under GATT and it's all that's been extinguished 
under the WTO in formal terms. – In informal 
terms, obviously there is always some dispute 
settlement that takes place out of the limelight – 
but also relative to other functions of the WTO, 
such as the negotiating branch and deliberative 
activities. Other speakers have already 
mentioned some of the difficulties there, but I 
wonder whether the crown jewel, as it's called, 
has overshadowed these functions to the 
detriment of advances in trade cooperation 
overall. I think this is the point that Jennifer was 
trying to make.   
There is a complex set of explanations as to why 
this imbalance has arisen: 1) It starts with the 
point that others have made, about the 
weaknesses, and ultimately the failure, with few 
minor exceptions, of the rulemaking function. 2) 
What James Flett identified as certain 
characteristics of the substantive rules that lead 
to excess demand and ultimately overload. 3) 
Some structural and systemic biases in the DSU 
itself in favor of win-lose adjudication, which 
has become the only form of dispute settlement.  
4) And the unchecked actions and incentives of 
the various participants in the dispute settlement 
system, on the part of both governments and 
adjudicators themselves.  
Now as a result we celebrate the contribution of 
the Dispute Settlement Mechanism to 
coherence, to security and predictability. But as 
Jennifer was suggesting, perhaps we neglect or 
at least, at best, we downplay the consequences 
of seeking to clarify every ambiguity, to fill every 
gap, and to clarify every provision and resolve 
every ambiguity. We downplay the consequence 
of that for the capacity and the willingness of 
parties and of members to negotiate new rules.  
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I recall as an advisor in the Canadian mission, to 
the Canadian negotiators on the TFA 
agreement, the  number of times a negotiator 
would come back and say “What will the 
Appellate Body say about this provision?” if 
they were to agree to something. From one 
perspective that's evidence of the success of the 
Appellate Body in establishing its authority. But 
effectively, it has meant that negotiators are 
stuck with having to make sure they can fine-
tune every single provision to the point where 
they can reasonably predict how it's going to be 
determined in the end.  
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism doesn't 
exist in “clinical isolation” of the broader 
political environment, so we need to have a 
better understanding of whether or not our 
current judicialised form of dispute settlement 
affects members’ incentives in ways that are not 
always positive. In other words, not all judicial 
clarifications contribute unambiguously to 
improving the prospects of trade cooperation. 
To the extent that the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism and its outcomes actually impede 
the development of new rules, it actually then 
impedes the development of international law 
and does not make a useful contribution.  
Second, I'm not entirely convinced that using 
the term “rule of law” in reference to the rules-
based trading system is appropriate. At least not 
in the way that that term is generally understood 
in domestic constitutional legal systems. This 
isn't just a semantic quibble. Our attempts to 
conceptualize the trading system according to 
these kinds of terms that are imported from 
constitutional legal systems are, I believe, partly 
responsible for the imbalances that we talked 
about several times today. Given the weakness 
in the rulemaking functions, the focus on 
concepts of rule of law contributes to an 
exaggerated emphasis on the adjudicative 
function. It demands respect for judicial 
independence above all other considerations in 
establishing the legitimacy of interpretations of 
the rules. I'm not arguing against judicial 
independence, I am just arguing against that the 
idea that it becomes the sole mechanism by 
which we allow for the legitimation of 
interpretations.  
The rule of law is ultimately about more than 
just the “rule of lawyers” and it's about more 
than the “rule of judges”. In the case of the 
WTO, as others have said, the absence of an 
effective rulemaking function that can act as a 
check and balance on the adjudicative function 
– either by correcting  adjudicative outcomes or 
by keeping the rules up to date just as a normal 
course of business – deprives the adjudicative 
function of a legitimizing mechanism. In that 
case, for the adjudicative function to assume 
more authority to compensate for the weak and 
ineffective rulemaking function, or for States, 
for that matter, to be expected to acquiesce to 
all adjudicated outcomes, without any recourse 
to corrective mechanisms, indeed, I would 
argue, undermines the rule of law rather than 
strengthens it, because it erodes the legitimacy 
of the rules themselves.  
Therefore, in a system that depends on the 
consent of states and depends on consensus 
decision making, can we truly speak of the “rule 
of law” in trade relations in the same way we 
speak about that in domestic constitutional 
context. The rules-based trading system, on the 
other hand, requires a different kind of 
separation of powers between rulemaking and 
adjudicative functions. That separation of 
powers is already differently conceived in and 
reflected in the current DSU. It's just not 
effective in the way it was originally designed.  
Third, the legitimacy challenges facing the 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism are already hard 
enough to deal with in the context of the 
existing rules, and are magnified by the changing 
balance of economic power. Trade agreements, 
as we've discussed already, embody negotiated 
balances (balances of concessions, balances of 
rights and obligations) – a single undertaking 
that captures these delicate negotiated 
outcomes.  
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One of the roles of the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism is to maintain that balance (DSU 
Article 3.3).  What happens when the previously 
negotiated balances are no longer politically 
optimal or politically  acceptable to some 
countries? The balance that's contained in the 
existing rules, to witness current events, seems 
to be eroding, in part, due to: 
• The center of gravity of the global 
economy shifting eastward, to 
economies that are less market-oriented. 
The resulting emergence of geopolitical 
rivalry is making normal approaches to 
dispute settlement take a second place;  
• The structural changes that are brought 
by the change in the global economy, 
and as a result of the fourth Industrial 
Revolution. These changes are only 
going to be become even greater; 
• Changes in the domestic political 
economy of some members in response 
to the consequences of previous rounds 
of  liberalization;  
• And, as some would argue, certainly the 
United States would argue, the results of 
previous disputes themselves have 
changed the balance of concessions and 
the balance of rights and obligations.  
 
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism can't really 
do much to address most of these emerging  
imbalances, other than do no more harm. Until 
they are addressed, presumably through 
negotiations, I suspect that adjudication – that is 
efforts to have win-lose adjudication provide 
outcomes seen as legitimate by all parties – will 
only get harder before it gets easier.  
Fourth, a related point, is about whether or not 
the Dispute Settlement Mechanism is 
representative. We already heard earlier this 
morning reference to an early controversy about 
a lack of gender balance in a preliminary version 
of the program for this Conference. The 
organizers are commended for doing their best 
to rectify the issue, but we can't really hold them 
completely responsible for that outcome. The  
challenge of achieving gender balance in the 
Conference reflects a lack of balance in the 
trade law community itself.  
 
But that's not the only systemic imbalance: this 
conference and the trade law community itself is 
also massively Eurocentric. It's Western, even 
Atlantic. Adding two women from North 
America and three from Europe responds 
somewhat to the original gender imbalance, but 
where are the panelists from China? Where are 
the academics and trade lawyers from China or 
from other Asian members, or even African 
members for that matter? In the context of the 
previous point about the shift in the center of 
gravity to the east and the south, the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism is going to have to do a 
much better job reflecting these perspectives, 
not only in the rules and procedures, but even in 
the activities such as this, to understand really 
the shift towards an Asian or Eurasian center of 
gravity. This will also go to the legitimacy of the 
rules.  
Finally, in conclusion, the question addressed to 
this particular panel about whether or not the 
Dispute Settlement  Mechanism contributed to 
international law and the rule of law is a 
backward-looking evaluation of the dispute 
settlement system. The answer to the question 
of the Conference, “What kind of dispute 
settlement for the WTO?” is a forward-looking 
assessment about what we need to do to 
preserve trade cooperation in the future and in 
the current fairly complicated environment.  
I'm going to close with just four quick ideas, 
most of which have already been raised by one 
or the other: First, adjudicators have to pay 
closer attention to the warnings about exercising 
“extraordinary circumspection”. Second, there is 
going to have to be a better effort and better 
opportunities to exercise collective oversight, 
and there's a couple of proposals about having 
members strengthening the rulemaking section. 
Third, there needs to be more opportunities for 
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mediation, a favorite point of mine. And finally, 
there will need to be some safety valves, so that 
some issues are completely diverted from 
adjudication, either through waivers, as Rob has 
pointed out, or by moratorium.  
Confronted with the current headwinds, there 
are a lot of calls, and we've heard them again 
today, for stiffening the resolve of other 
Members in defending the current operation of 
the Dispute Settlement  Mechanism. I just want 
to refer, as a closing point, to a fable or proverb 
that's common in a lot of cultures: “a mighty 
oak tree breaks in a storm, while the willow 
bends with the wind and survives.” 
So the question for us now is what kind of 
dispute settlement system does the WTO need 
now: a broken oak tree or a surviving willow? 
To put that in the perspective of George's 
Darwinism, it's not the “strongest” version of 
the Dispute Settlement system that will survive, 
but the “fittest”.
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Comments, Questions and Answers following Session 4
 
James Flett  
 
A really quick couple of  questions. We've had a 
huge amount of  information given to us during 
the course of  this Conference. Extremely 
interesting. This discussion would be very 
interesting in normal times, but we're not in 
normal times, we're facing a very particular fact 
in December - that we won't have an Appellate 
Body anymore. My question is to the panel - if  
you want to offer to the audience the one single 
item to take away from this Conference, what is 
it, and would you agree with me that that item is 
that the US blocking of  the Appellate Body 
appointments is completely unacceptable? The 
second question is, if  nothing changes, what is 
the one item you would give the audience to take 
away, if  nothing changes in the US behavior? 
What should the rest of  us do: should we 
abandon the system, or should we use Article 25 
to keep it going? 
 
Georges Abi-Saab  
 
I am against breaking the system to satisfy a 
member as a matter of  principle. Now this does 
not mean that we can’t find ways to face up to 
the situation within the system. As Nicolas 
Lockhart suggested, I think the best way is simply 
to dilly dally in order to gain time, without 
touching the institution. Part of  the institution 
may be paralyzed for example because the AB 
does not have sufficient members, etc. But we 
can use other palliatives available within the 
system, be they contrived or less efficient, while 
thinking of  other solutions that may dispose of  
the paralysis. But don’t play with the structure 
itself, because if  you brake  or reduce it, it will be, 
in my view, impossible to reproduce it or its 





Quick comment on mediation. I don't 
think  there's a lack of  demand for it. I think 
there's a structural disincentive to it. There's 26 
provisions in the DSU about adjudication, one 
for mediation and one for arbitration. It's 
obvious why when clients come to their lawyers 
and  seek a solution, they're going to go to the 
one that has the most well-developed  process. If  
we provide an opportunity to make them more 
certain,  it would be more widely used. On 
James's question, I'd agree that the US  position 
is unacceptable, but I don't agree that it's 
completely unacceptable. In part that comes 
from my own experience of  being with the 
United  States in the DSU review for five years, 
and maybe understanding their concerns a  little 
bit more closely than others, and and I think they 
have tried I think  they've tried almost from the 
beginning, they've tried to have their concerns, 
and others have abused consensus in the reverse 
way to prevent them from having  any outcome. 
Finally, don't let it get to that: don't let it get to 
December, when the system is completely 
dysfunctional. There are lots  of  potential 
solutions here, everybody just has to have a little 




In response to the question that was raised "Is it 
outrageous what the US does? Some media 
reports have suggested the US may also be 
seeking leverage on other issues. I don't know, 
but these reports suggest that ultimately the goal 
is to modify substantive rules, more than just the 
Dispute Settlement Body or the AB process. 
When all this started, I told some colleagues that 
Julio Lacarte, who has now passed away, 
explained to me that when the Havana Charter 
failed (the US had initiated the process and 
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pushed it ahead before they decided not to ratify 
and to withdrew) only the GATT was there, and 
that was initially only on a provisional basis and it 
had no  institution to support it.  Then the UN 
loaned a table, a couple of  chairs and two-three 
staff, and the GATT started its long road and 
managed to survive and to make it through until 
the birth of  the WTO. So I'm optimistic on this 
front that the WTO will ultimately survive. 
Should the Article 25 Appeal arbitration be used? 
I can understand why Members are considering 
this option. It may not be as institutionalized as 
the EU would like it to be, but it would confirm 
the benefits of  and provide for a review process 
within the WTO dispute system.  The scheme 
may be closer to a set of  bilateral agreements 
more than a plurilateral deal.   
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